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SUMMARY
Achieving a high degree of convergence is a precondition for moving to the final stage 
economic and monetary union (EMU) as defined in the Treaty on European Union which
entered into force on 1 November 1993. The second stage of EMU will start on 
January 1994. The move to stage two is not .conditional on any particular achievements
on convergence, neither economic nor institutional. However, the current state of play
regarding economic and monetary convergence must be assessed in order to have a view
of the progress made during stage one. The Treaty requires the Council to make such an
assessment, based on a report presented by the commission (article 109 e 2 (b));
moreover, the Treaty requires the assessment to cover also the progress made with the
implementation of Community law concerning the internal market. The attached report is
intended to fu1fi1 these Treaty requirements.
Progress in economic and monetary convergence during stage one of EMU which started
on 1st July 1990 was mixed: while on the inflation front there were positive
developments, the same cannot be said about public finances. As regards real
convergence, the progress achieved in improving supply conditions, namely through the
implementation of the internal market programme has been obscured by the sharp rise in
unemployment and the stalling of the catching-up process in the Community.
These developments in convergence must be seen against the background 
of a much
worse than expected economic situation. Indeed, following a marked deceleration of
economic activity since the early nineties the European Community entered into
recession in mid 1992 (i.e. in the middle of stage one). The European Monetary System
(EMS), which is the cornerstone of monetary integration, was not immune to these
developments and the period of high turbulence in the exchange rate markets which
started in the Summer of 1992 culminated in the significant widening of the fluctuation
margins one year later; in between, two major currencies suspended their participation in
the system and several realignments of parities took place. Finally, the recessionary
context and the rise in unemployment made more evident some structural weaknesses
still prevailing in the Community.
In spite of these adverse developments, which are in marked contrast with the
expectations prevailing at the beginning of stage one, Member States have remained
committed to the convergence process and to the necessary structural reform.
Convergence programmes have been adopted by most Member States and
, in general
projected measures were implemented at least on the scale initially envisaged as
,-necessary. -Reforms geared to the removal of structural rigidities affecting their national
economies were taken by all Member States, in welcome contrast with the past when
they were frequently postponed. On the institutional front, the process of central bank
/) (ii)
independence has progressed clearly ahead of the Treaty requirements. Meanwhile, the
completion of the internal market, which is the most ambitious structural reform at
Community level, has been largely achieved. It is therefore fair to say that although
economic developments during stage one partly veil the results of the convergence
efforts made by Member States, much was achieved in the structural and institutional
fields. These achievements, although less visible, will provide strong support to a sound
construction of EMU.
Visible progress was achieved in inflation performance during stage one, both as regards
the level and the degree of convergence. The inflation rates in 1993 in seven Member
States are estimated to be within the limits to be aimed for according to the Treaty,
which is of the order of 3 - 4% this year. Of these Member States, six have shown a
remarkable regularity during the period (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland
Luxembourg and the Netherlands), while the United Kingdom has entered the reference
range for the first time this year. As regards the remaining Member States, the somewhat
poorer performance of Germany in the recent period has been mainly due to the special
circumstances of unification; in Spain and Italy inflation has been decelerating and the
5% plateau has been broken this year; in Portugal inflation is now much closer to the
reference range compared with the double digit inflation in the early nineties. Although
progress has been achieved, inflation in Greece remains far above the Community
average.
Member States' public finances deteriorated significantly during stage one of EMU. 
appears that fiscal policy has had to playa major role in accommodating the recession
either through the working of the automatic stabilizers or, in a few cases, as a result of a
deliberately anti-cyclical budgetary stance. The deficit of the general government
represented, for the Community as a whole, 6.4% ofGDP in 1993, a figure clearly above
that of the beginning of the decade. Although more than three quarters of this
deterioration can be accounted for by cyclical factors, the current situation is hardly
sustainable. Decisive action is necessary to reduce budgetary imbalances in the
Community, supported by an adequate policy mix leading to steady and sustained
economic growth; indeed, developments during stage one have shown that the
convergence of budgetary positions to the benchmark values of the Treaty while
recession persists is a very difficult task.
The deterioration of the budgetary situation has been generalised throughout the
Community. In 1993, with the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, no other Member
State is expected to comply strictly with the deficit benchmark of 3% of GDP. The
deterioration is most evident in Denmark, Germany, France and the United Kingdom
(where the public deficits in percent of GDP in 1993 are estimated to reach 4.4%, 4.
9% and 1. , respectively), given the low level of earlier deficits. Except for
Germany, these countries took deliberate measures to mitigate the effects of the
economic slowdown. In Spain, the widening of the deficit in 1993 to 7.2% ofGDP more
than offset the progress achieved in the previous year; a similar development occurred in
Portugal. Some other Member States aiming at fiscal consolidation either remained on 
gradual upward trend or achieved a stabilization in their government deficit
, e.g. Italy. In
the Netherlands, the deficit was brought down after 1990 and was kept at relatively low
II (ill)
level (4.0% of GDP in 1993), while Ireland and Luxembourg stand as the Community
Member States with the lowest deficits.
Having ocurred in a period of low, if not negative, real growth and of low or
decelerating inflation, the widening of governments deficits has led tOll. rise in the public
debt to GDP ratios throughout most of the Community. This situation is particularly
worrying for those Member States where the public debt to GDP ratio is clearly above
the 60% benchmark; the public debt to GDP ratio is now over 100% in three Member
States and has not yet been stabilized, which must first be achieved before the required
steady decline.
Progress was achieved as far as convergence in long term interest rates within the
Community is concerned. Long term interest rates have declined since 1990 and the
dispersion among Member States has narrowed; all but four Member States already
satisfY the interest-rate criterion of the Treaty. This trend largely reflects the favourable
development of inflation and illustrates the high level of financial integration achieved in
the Conununity.
The stability of exchange rates within the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System came under increasing pressures from mid 1992 as
uncertainties were created about progress towards EMU by the delays in the ratification
of the Treaty on European Union. For several of the currencies which have been
realigned or for which participation in the ERM has been suspended, this was a reflection
of accumulated divergences in inflation and cost performance. More generally, the
continuing pressures on other currencies and the decision in early August 1993 to widen
the fluctuation margins to +/-15% resulted from the problems created by the high interest
rates needed in Germany to cope with the effects of unification for other countries faced
with recession. The cautious approach to interest-rate reductions that has been adopted
since August indicates a desire to maintain a commitment within the Conununity to
monetary cooperation based on stable exchange rates.
Although not spelled out in Article 109 of the Treaty, real convergence cannot be
ignored. Achievements in this domain were disappointing given the sharp increase in the
unemployment rate in the Community, from 8.3% in 1990 to 10.6% in 1993, which
means a jobless total of about 17 million on average this year. In addition, the process of
catching up, which made significant progress during the late eighties stalled with the
current recession. However, supply conditions have improved in the Community through
the implementation of structural reforms; in addition, the profitability of investment
which is important to cope with the challenge of unemployment, does not seem to have
been damaged overmuch by the current cyclical downswing.
Progress in implementation of Community Law regarding the Internal Market:
The legislative framework for an Internal Market, as defined in the Commissions White
Paper of 1985, is now almost fully in place. 95% of the checklist of White Paper
legislation has now been adopted, and is in the process of being implemented by the EC
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institutions and Member States. This accomplishment is all the more impressive as the
measures which require the greatest adjustment on the part of the Member States - the
switchover to the transitional" VAT regime, the abolition of capital controls, the
fteedom to provide banking and insurance services throughout the EC. a ftarnework for
the li~eralisation of public procurement in all sectors including the utility sectors. the
liberalisation of air and road transport - have all been successfully negotiated and
adopted. The legislative steps which have already been taken constitute the princiJnU
elements of the Internal Market ftaniework, and will be sufficient to trigger the bulk 
the pro competitive and resource allocation gains which will flow ftom internal market
completion.
. A handful of White Paper measures remain on the table. many of which would greatly
facilitate the exercise of cross-border activities by economic operators. In particular.
progress on proposals relating to the introduction of a Community trade mark, the
alleviation of double taxation problems. and the creation of a European Company Statute
are eagerly .awaited by the business community. The Community must also look beyond
the White Paper to areas where additional trade barriers have been identified. As regards
the abolition of ftontier controls on the ftee .InOvement of persons. the recent Schengen
Ministerial meeting fixed February 1. 1994 as the target date for the removal of these
controls. Another area for further action includes sectors where the granting of exclusive
rights at national level has precluded cross-border competition. The Commission has
now tabled proposals or launched discussion on possible forms of liberallsation in voice
telephony, energy, and postal services. Internal market completion in these sectors has
progressed at varying speeds and with varying degrees of success.
On the whole. the back of the legislative work has been broken. The task of the
Community is now to ensure that the legal openings stemming ftom this legalftamework
are now effectively translated into commercial opportunities. The first and most crucial
stage of this process will be to ensure that Internal Market enabling legislation is properly
transposed in all Member States. At this stage, 86% of necessary transposition measures
have now been taken, and there is continual improvement on this ftont. Member States
have been less diligent in transposing Internal Market legislation in the fields of company
law, public procurement, and financial services, possibly because these measures entered
into force at a later date and transposition was accorded a lower priority.
However. the task of making the Internal Market work does not stop at monitoring the
rate of transposition. The Commission is currently elaborating its Strategic Programme
for the Internal Market. which is designed to maximise the benefits of the Internal
Market ftamework for consumers, citizens. and enterprises. This involves coherent
action on a number of ftonts. In particular, the Community must now devote increased
attention and resources to the following themes:
monitoring the quality. as well as the rate of transposition, and improving the
transparency of national transposition measures:(v)
ensuring the quality of enforcement by setting up necessary channels for
administrative cooperation, and developing new instruments for monitoring
enforcement:
preventing the emergence of new barriers to trade through stringent application of
competition policy safeguards, and the reinforcement of early-warning systems for
the detection and prevention of new regulatory or administrative trade barriers:
enforcement can also be improved by imposition of sanctions on recalcitrant
Member States:
empowering businesses and consumers to defend their rights within the Internal
Market by improving access to justice, and ensuring an even interpretation and
application ofEC law:
ongoing monitoring and evaluation of Internal Market legislation and its impact
with a view to upgrading its performance.
In addition, the Community must look at ways of improving the interaction between
Internal Market measures and other Community policies which can make a contribution
to the improved functioning of the single market - notably, policies to assist SMEs
standardisation, conformity assessment, competition policy, environmental policy, and
the common commercial policy.
Internal Market enabling legislation, whose impact will be amplified by the Strategic
Programme, creates a legal and administrative environment in which economic operators
can develop their activities on a pan-European scale. It allows them to exploit market
opportunities or tap resources in other Member States. At this stage, economic operators
are begin.~g to witness some of the concrete benefits of a single market. For instance
Border controls and formalities on cross-border shipments of goods are now 
thing of the past.
Technical harmonising legislation which was adopted at an early stage of the
Internal Market programme is eroding technical trade barriers in sectors such 
toys, medico-surgical equipment, and pressure vessels.
The removal of controls on capital movements has contributed in no small measure
to the increased integration of some Member States into international capital
markets. This in turn has facilitated cross-border investment and eased credit
shortages in those Member States.
Although the advantages of internal market integration are beginning to filter through, it
would be premature to undertake a global assessment of the Internal Market at this
stage. For a start, much Internal Market legislation has yet to enter into force, or to be
transposed into national legislation. Secondly, complementary actions to capitalise fully
on the potential of the single market must be implemented in parallel with the legislative
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ftamework (e.g, Trans~European Networks the development of European
standardisation, etc). Last but by no means least, economic operators must become
acclimatised to the new legislative environment and learn how to turn legal developments
into commercial opportunities. This learning process may take some time, and the
current recession has reduced the scope and willingness on the part of companies to
undertake adventurous cross-border expansion.
Nevertheless, there are some preliminary indications that anticipation effects unleashed
by the the Internal Market programme have been the catalyst for a revitalisation of
corporate strategies and a shake-up of market structures in many industrial and services
sectors. Many companies have responded proactively to the emerging Internal Market
and this has been reflected in the following trends:
a surge in intra-EC foreign direct investment which has been heavily concentrated
in those sectors most directly concerned by internal market liberalisation:
the wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions which has formed part of the
increase in intra-Community FDI:
increased interest on the part of third country investors in locating in the
Community:
indications that the Internal Market has been accompanied by profound changes in
the degree of market integration in banking and insurance markets. 
marked evolution in the proportion of output from particular sectors which is sold
on other Community markets, and an increasing share of national consumption
which is met by intra~Community imports.
These trends suggest an increasing Europeanisation of companies sales strategies and
increased competitive discipline on domestic incumbents in the markets concerned. The
impact of the Internal Market on business dynamics and market structures will be
examined in greater detail in the study which is to be finalised by the Commission before
the end of 1996. This study will also analyse the contribution of the Internal Market to
the realisation of other Community objectives, such as economic and social cohesion and
the achievement of sustainable non-inflationary growth which respects the environment.
The Internal Market programme is not being constructed in an economic vacuum. The
current recession, which has been provoked by forces unrelated to the completion of the
Internal Market, has overshadowed the process of adaptation to the emerging single
market ftamework. The depressed state of EC markets obscures the potential market
openings created by the Internal Market. In addition, many, particularly small and
medium sized, companies do not have the resources or are wary of positioning
themselves in order to take advantage of opportunities which lie around the comer.
However, there are reasons to believe that the restructuring and investment undertaken
during the late 1980s in anticipation of the internal market have strengthened the
underlying competitiveness of Community industry and services. These latent strengths
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will provide individual companies with a springboard once economic recovery gets
underway. In addition, the Internal Market has acted as a brake on any temptation on the
part of Member States to renationalisecertain elements of economic, monetary or
commercial policy. Any misguided return to "go-it -alone" policies would have proved
counterproductive for economic op~rators and the Member States concerned.
The recent widening of margins for exchange rate fluctuation contains some poteirtial
dangers for the operation of the single market, should these new exchange rate
arrangements not be managed carefully. In particular, the increased scope for exchange
rate fluctuations could disrupt the operation of capital markets, while sudden changes in
relative competitiveness provoked by nominal exchange rate fluctuations could generate
demands for safeguard restrictions on cross-border trade. To this extent, a return to
greater exchange rate stability represents a precondition for the proper functioning of the
Internal Market. Conversely, the Internal Market prognunme can promote structural and
micro economic convergence which is needed to sustain further progress towards
Economic and Monetary Union.
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PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY CONVERGENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
The first stage of economic and monetary union (EMU) started on 1 July 1990. During
this stage, the idea of economic convergence is embedded in the multilateral surveillance
procedure (Council decision 90/141/EEC of 12. 1990 on the attainment of progressive
convergence of economic policies and performance during stage one of economic and
monetary union, OJ, L- 78, 24. 1990). This report is intended to fulfil the requirement of
the Treaty on European Union (Article 10ge, 2(b)) according to which, before the
beginning of the second stage of economic and monetary union on 1 January 1994
The Council shall, on the basis of a report from the Commission, assess the progress
made with regard to economic and monetary convergence, in particular with regard to
price stability and sound public finances, and the progress made with the
implementation of Community law concerning the internal market"
Part I of this report deals with the progress made in economic and monetary
convergence. It covers aspects of nominal convergence, real convergence and
convergence in supply conditions. Part IT of the report focuses on progress with the
implementation of Community law concerning the internal market.
Convergence is a wide and dynamic issue. Achieving a large degree of nominal
convergence is the precondition for a smooth working of a stability-oriented monetary
policy. Price stability is one of the main objectives of economic and monetary policy in
the Treaty on European Union. A low inflation level is the basic target of monetary
policy, while sound public finances contribute to achieving that goal. In countries where
disinflation and fiscal consolidation must be achieved simultaneously, the need to avoid
serious repercussions on employment will focus attention on complementary labour
market policies. While achieving convergence in inflation and fiscal positions mainly
depends upon the economic ftamework in an individual Member State, the stability of
other variables, e.g. interest and exchange rates, depends also upon market perceptions
of economic policies.
On the macroeconomic side the Treaty on Economic Union spells out nominal
convergence requirements, but real convergence cannot be ignored. The Treaty lists four
convergence criteria (Article 109 j and a separate protocol to the Treaty) to which the
Member Statesl) should make progress. Although Member States are not obliged to fulfil
these criteria during the first stage of EMU, they clearly act as reference targets to which
Member States should converge. This report, therefore, takes these criteria as
1) Denmark and the United Kingdom have opt-out clauses concerning the move to the third stage.
/1 4benchmarks, recognizing that approaching these targets (rather than achieving them) is
the primary task of the first stage and should be continued during the second stage.
As regards real convergence, the Treaty is less precise although an important part is
devoted to strengthening economic and social cohesion, which is one of the objectives of
the Union (Article B of Treaty commom provisions).
Although achieving real convergence is primarily the responsibility of the Member States, 
many Community policies are aimed at facilitating this process . Therefore, the present
report not only looks at the progress in relation to the fonnally stated nominal
convergence criteria but also reviews the achievements in real convergence. It examines
both progress in the catching-up of standards of living betWeen Member States and
divergencies in unemployment.
Convergence of supply conditions is dealt with from two perspectives. The Community
dimension mainly concerns the economic aspects of the implementation 
of the internal
market. An analysis of the progress achieved in this domain is provided in part n of this
report; the internationalization of Member States' enterprises is visible in trade
integration, mergers and acquisitions, and direct investment activities. At Member State
level, structural reform to improve the supply side is a primary goal. Labour market
reform, and measures to foster private investment and aiming at greater competition are
major elements of such a strategy.
From an institutional point of view the Treaty states that Member States should start, if
necessary, the process leading to central bank independence. The final section of part 1 of
the report reviews the progress achieved in this area.
2. ACffiEVEMENTS IN CONVERGENCE: MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS
1 Major economic events and the current economic situation
Stage I of EMU was characterized by major economic events. The implications of
German unification not only determined economic developments in that country, but also
had important repercussions on the Community economy as a whole during the period
under consideration. While the initial effects were favourable for Europe, the adopted
policy mix triggered restrictive effects later on. Spain and the United Kingdom joined the
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in June 1989 and October 1990, respectively. Both
countries were facing special challenges. In Spain the catching-up process required
adequate responses in policies, while in the United Kingdom the policy assignment had to
2) Article HOb of the Treaty on European Union states that.
... 
The Community shall also support the achievement of these objectives  (strengthening of
economic and social cohesion)  by the action It takes through the structural Funds (European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guldance Section; European Social Fund; European
Regional Development Fund), the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial
Instrumentsbe altered as monetary policy was no longer available for. short-term anti-cyclical
stabilization purposes. Portugal subsequently joined the ERM in April 1992. The Danish
" in June 1992, the uncertainties surrounding the outcome of the Fr~nch referendum,
the political process of ratification in the United Kingdom and the 
challenging of the
Treaty on European Union before the German Supreme .court delayed the ratification
process.
As explained in detail in section 2. 5 below the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System (EMS) went through .a period of marked instability from
mid-1992, during which several realignments of parities took place and the United
Kingdom and Italy suspended their participation in the ERMsystem. In August 1993 the
fluctuations margins were widened markedly.
Nevertheless, during stage I, Member States remained committed to the convergence
process. Convergence programmes have been adopted by most of the Member States; so
far the Council has discussed and endorsed convergence programmes of nine Member
States (by order of presentation: Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands
Spain, Belgium, Greece and the United Kingdom), mainly devoted to achieving fiscal
consolidation. Moreover, monetary policy was geared to the goal of achieving and
preserving a high degree of price stability. Although progress in convergence was
achieved in some areas, economic developments veiled some of the convergence results
in other areas.
Indeed, the Community economy is faced with important challenges. The current deep
recession has led to falling levels of output, rapidly rising unemployment and widening
budget deficits. One positive element is the continuation of favourable inflation trends in
most Community countries. Trends in consumer and investor confidence, although no
longer falling, do not suggest a significant recovery in the short term. Therefore, during
the last two years, the unfavourable economic climate has been hampering visible
achievements in convergence, and this may well continue through 1994.
The environment within which economic policies were conducted has become more
difficult during stage I of EMU. While the overall monetary stance within the Community
has remained relatively tight given the extent of the slowdown in economic activity, fiscal
policy has responded by either letting the automatic stabilizers work or even - in some
countries - by discretionary fiscal loosening. It appears that fiscal policy has had to play
the bigger role in accommodating the recession. Countries which entered the period of
economic slowdown with still high budget deficits were faced with even greater
difficulties in pursuing consolidation. Since 1992, high headline inflation rates and strong
monetary growth in Germany have implied a strategy of caution in interest rate policy,
while the economic fundamentals of the other countries would have suggested a more
aggressive easing in domestic monetary conditions. The recurrent tensions on the foreign
exchange markets were due both to unsound nominal exchange rate fundamentals in
some countries and to inconsistencies within the policy mix adopted during a severe
recession by other countries.In this climate of unbalanced policy mixes, recession and rising unemployment certain
structural weaknesses within the Community have become more evident and results in
terms of convergence have been mixed. While inflation has declined almost everywhere
in the Community, particularly in those countries whose inflation rates have been most
divergent, budgetary outtums have worsened significantly.
Nominal convergence: achievements and chaUenges
1 Int1ation
In the Community, it is now recognized that a low rate of inflation is the prerequisite for
sound medium-term growth as it contributes to an efficient allocation of resources.
Moreover, in the perspective of constructing EMU, convergence in inflation rates of the
Member States is needed in order to avoid losses in competitiveness if exchange rates are
moving towards a fixed regime. Substantial price differentials, in the tradeable goods
sector implying a "competitiveness gap" between Member States, would either create
higher regional unemployment - as cross-border labour mobility remains comparatively
low in Europe - or require a painful downward wage and price adjustment. However
within a monetary union, some differences in inflation rates can exist without detrimental
effects. Assuming that the inflation rates of the three best performing countries are close
to each other, the Maastricht inflation criterion (see below) envisages inflation differen-
ces comparable to those broadly prevailing in existing monetary unions (1 to 2%).
A considerable improvement in convergence among Member States was one of the
encouraging features of economic developments in the Community during the second
half of the 19.80s. In particular, there was considerable progress in convergence of
inflation rates towards a low level. Graph! shows that the average rate of inflation
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Source: Commission  servIces,  economIc forecClSt (Autumn  1993)declined from above 12% in the early 1980s to slightly above 3% in 1986, a year
influenced by the fall in oil prices. There was then a modest acceleration until 1991 but
inflation has abated again in the last two years. Moreover, the dispersion between the
high inflation countries and the low inflation countries has been declining considerably.
The Treaty on European Union contains a definition of the convergence requirements
regarding inflation for stage ill of EMU3). In recent years a number of Member States
have had an impressive performance in terms of low inflation. As shown in table 1, seven
Member States were below the upper value of the reference range in 1993.
Table 1: Inflation performance of Member States 1990-
Inflation (deflator of private consumption) : consumer
price inde:z.:
% change p. % change
over 12 months
1990 1991 1991 1993
2.40 7(Oct.
1.90 1.40 1.2(Sept.)
WD (a) 9(Oct.
D(a)
19. 18. 14. 13. 12.3(Oct.
6.4 6.4 3(Sept.)
2.30 3(Sept.)
IRL 1.60 1.4(Q3;b)
4.3(Oct.
5(Oct.
3.4 1.9(Oct.
12. ILl 0(Sept.)
l.8(Sept.;b)
EUR- (a) 4.4 4(Sept.)
EUR+ (a)
Reference ranee 8 - 4.4 3.4 - 3. 9 - 3.
(a)
Commission services, economic forecast (Autumn  1993)
The three best peiforming Member States in inflation: the reference range has been calculated by
assuming that either the best peiforming country or the third best peiforming country determines the
reference range.
WD  West Germany, D  Unified Germany
EUR-  EUR12 incl. West Germany, EUR+  EUR12 incl. Unified Germany
Excluding the housing component the figures are: 2.2%.(lRL) and  6%  (UK)
Source:
(b)
3) Price convergence is defined in the Treaty on European Union in relative rather than absolute
terms. It shall mean that a Member State has a price perfonnance that is sustainable and an
average rate of inflation over a period of one year before moving to stage III does not exceed by
more than 1 \12 percentage points that of, at most, the three best perfonning Member States (article
1O9j,l and article 1 of the Protocol on the convergence criteria referred to in article 1O9j).
The Treaty requires convergence in the consumer price index (CPI) on a comparable basis taking
account of differences in national definitions. In order to ensure comparability the analysis here is
made in terms ofthe national accounts deflator of private consumption.There is a remarkable regularity in those countries which experienced a low rate of
inflation during the period under review. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France
Luxembourg and the Netherlands have been within the range throughout the first stage
of EMU. Germanys somewhat poorer performance since 1992 is mainly due to the
special circumstances of unification. The United Kingdom which was well above the
reference range in 1991, especially, has since seen a slowing in the inflation rate sufficient
to be below the upper reference limit in 1993. As regards those countries which have not
satisfied the criterion during the period, Spain, Italy and Portugal are moving in the right
direction. It appears that up to now the depreciation of the currencies of these four
countries in 1992 and 1993 against other Community currencies has not interrupted the
process of disinflation although import prices contributed temporarily to inflation. Given
the extent of the currency adjustment involved, this is a very encouraging feature which
needs to be maintained. Although progress has been achieved, inflation in Greece
remains far above the Community average.
Reducing inflation rates or maintaining an already satisfactory inflation performance has
been one of the central objectives of the convergence programmes. The progress
achieved has so far been broadly in line with the indicative targets set in the programmes
although in Germany headline inflation is coming down more slowly than projected.
Some of the programmes have placed considerable emphasis on the need to reform
wage-setting procedures and other aspects of the labour market and to increase
competition in product and services markets in order to restrain inflation, and some
advances have been made (e.g. abolition of wage indexation and new wage-setting
system in Italy). Other countries have been orientating their wage settlements toward
improving external competitiveness (e.g. Denmark, France) through a strategy of low
wage cost increases. More recently the moves towards central bank independence in
some countries have tended to increase the credibility of stability oriented policies with
favourable effects on actual wage settlements and long-term interest rates. In the United
Kingdom, the impact of a deep recession in reducing the core inflation rate has been
significantly enhanced by the successful labour market reforms of the 1980s.
Inflation convergence towards a low level has made even more progress with regard to
tradeable goods and services. Export prices have been very flat and below 2% on
average for the Community as a whole during the 1990-93 period. The greater
competition already achieved in these sectors has contributed to price discipline. Similar
developments can be expected if competition is increased in other sectors through the
realization of the Single Market, in particular in services like transportation, insurance
and financial services. In some Member States, e.g. in the catching-up countries
structural changes may to a certain extent explain relatively high inflation. While high
productivity growth in manufacturing is maintaining competitiveness in the tradeable
sectors, relatively high wage increases have had spill-over effects on non-tradeables
where productivity growth was lower, leading to a relatively high domestic-basket
inflation rate.
While the effects of stronger competition and structural changes are difficult to measure
a more traditional analysis of factors which have contributed to inflation during the 1990-
93 period suggests a favourable impact ffom import prices in the early part of theperiod. In addition to their direct price-stabilising impact (see Box 1) import prices
reduced input costs at the producer level which prevented profit margms ftom falling
more significantly in the tradeable sector. In the period 1992-93 the effects of import
prices were less uniform. It appears that those countries which continued to belong to
the ERM core were able to import price stability while those countries which devalued in
1992 and 1993 were experiencing an upward contribution of import prices to inflation.
However, there are hopes that these will prove to be once for-all effects.
After a fairly high contribution of unit labour costs to inflation in some countries
(Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom) in 1990, almost all couniries are
now experiencing a lower contribution fTom this source. Lower nominal wage increases
due to the recession but also the attempts of many countries to improve productivity
through structural reform are the main elements behind this feature, which 
encouraging as far as inflation prospects beyond 1993 are concerned.
Increases in indirect taxes played a relatively important role as a determinant of headline
inflation in a number of countries in the early 1990s. In Germany higher indirect taxes
were one important means to cope with the fiscal challenges of unification, while other
Member States increased indirect taxes to make progress in fiscal consolidation.
Box 1: Contributions tohd1ation
This box provides a mechanical assessment of the factors which have contributed to the
change of the deflator of final uses (the national accounts index measuring the prices 
final domestic demand and exports in aggregate). The table disentangles the domestic
components into unit labour costs, net indirect taxes and the gross operating surplus.
All. regards the latter, an increase in profit margins would be indicated by a high
contribution of the gross operating surplus. The table does not provide information about
causalities. For example, profit margins might rise because of either a decline in other
contributing factors, e.g. lower unit labour costs, or demand-induced inflation enabling
enterprises to increase prices. Moreover, only the direct impact of import prices is
considered while lower import prices for material inputs are reflected in a larger gross
operating surplus.
A direct link to the implicit deflator of private consumption or the consumer price index
(CPI) cannot be easily made. For example, the effects of indirect taxes on the private
consumption deflator might be larger as various demand components (investment
exports) are exempted :from various indirect taxes.
The data do not necessarily add up as it is mechanically impossible to differentiate
between volume and price effects as far as the contribution of import prices is
concerned. Therefore, information about the determinants of inflation can only be taken
as a crude guide of the transmission mechanisms of inflation.(Box 1 cont.)
Contribution to the change in the final uses deOator (b)
% points per year
Import prices
1990 1991 1992 1993
-0. -0. -0. 1.3
-0. -0.
WD (a) -0. 0.4 -0. -0.
D(a) -0. -0.
-0. -0. 1.8
-0. -0.4 -0.
IRL 1.5 -0.4 1.9
1.9
-0. 1.4
-0.4 -0.
-0. 1.4
-0. 1.8
Net indirect taxes
1990 1991 1992 1993
-0. -0.
WD (a) 0.3
D(a)
0.3 1.0 -0.
0.4 -0.
IRL 1.5 -0. -0.
1.1 1.0
0.3 -0.
1.3 1.1 1.9 -0.
-0. 1.1
Source:
(a)
(b)
Nominal unit labour costs
1990 1991 1992 1993
1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
1.0 1.9 1.7
12. 6.5 6.3
1.9
-0. 1.8 1.3
-0. 1.6
1.0
1.7
1.5 1.6 1.2
6.5
Groll8 operating surplus
1990 1991 1992 1993
-0.4 -0. -0.
1.7 1.1 -0.4
1.2 0.4
1.7
1.6
1.0
-0. -0.
1.4
1.3 1.0 -0.
0.3 -0.
1.0
Commission services, economicforecast (Autumn  1993)
WD  West Gennany,  D =  Unified Gennany
The table contains mechanical calC1llations of the various factors ccmtributing to final demand
deflators. As regards the consumer price deflator the efftcts of indirect taxes might be larger as various
demand components are exemptedfrom e.g. VAT.2 Public finances
While the average government deficit4) in the Community was almost halved during the
1980s (ftom above 5% ofGDP in 1981 to less than 3% in 1989), the government deficit
soared to more than 6% in 1993. Although some of this increase is due to cyclical
factors, the speed of deterioration is very worrying indeed.
This rapid deterioration in the Community position is reflected in the performance of
individual countries. Latest estimates for 1993 indicate that all Member States, except
Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, will have higher deficits this year than in 1990. This
trend deterioration is more especially evident in Denmark, Germany, France and the
United Kingdom, given the low level of earlier deficits. Except for Germany, these
countries took deliberate fiscal measures to mitigate the effects of the economic
slowdown. In Spain, the widening of the deficit in 1993 more than offset the progress
achieved in the previous year; a similar development occurred in Portugal, where
however, fiscal consolidation is more pressing. Some other Member States aiming at
fiscal consolidation either remained at a gradual upward trend (Belgium) or achieved 
stabilization in their government deficit, e.g. Italy despite the more unfavourable
. economic environment. In the Netherlands the deficit was brought down after 1990 and
was kept at a relatively low level, while Ireland and Luxemburg stand as the Community
Members where the deficit is the lowest.
Graph 2: Net borrowing of general government, EC, 1981..93
In%ofGDP
4 --------""""""""",,""""""'--'-'-'-""""'-"
"""-"-.................-..'-""""-""""'- "","""""""""""""'-'-""-'-"""""" "" .-........................--................-...-...-.-
6 .....-..-
-,.......................... .......-...................." ...............................-..-................ .........---.................... ....."...................-....................,.......
3 .....-.....---
,..---...-"-...............-........---...........,..--.-............................"..---..............--...-.............-..-. '-""" ,-",,""----"'-""""-""-"-""""""""'-""' ..-' ..-""
SOL/rce: Commission services, economic forecast (ALltumn  1993)
4) The definition used in this report for the government deficit (net borrowing of general govenunent)
largely confonns with the definition of the Treaty on European Union (article 1O4c of the Treaty
and article 2 of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure). Full conformity with the Treaty
requires complete harmonization of concepts which will be completed on the basis of the
forthcoming secondary legislation.In 1993 only Ireland and Luxemburg would comply strictly with the Treaty general
government deficit reference value 00% of GDP while in the early 1990s also Denmark,
Germany, France and the United Kingdom had budget deficits below 3% of GDpS). In
these countries, the expected deterioration in the public finance situation ftom the
previous year is evident. While in Germany the combined effects of unification and the
deepening recession are reflected in the public finances, Denmark and France have
sought to reduce the effects of recession by a pro-active fiscal policy, an approach similar
to that followed by the United Kingdom in 1992.
Table 2: Government net borrowing of Member States 1990-
General government netbotrowing
in % of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993
7.4
1.5
WD (a) 3.5
D (a)
18. 16.3 13. 15.
1.5
10. 10. 9.5 10.
1.0 2.5 2.5
2.5 3.5
5.5 6.4 9(b)
1.2
EUR- (a) 6.4
EUR+ (a)
Reference value
Source:
(a)
Commission services, economic forecast (Autumn  1993)
WD  West Gennany, D  Unified Gennany
EUR-  EUR12 incI. West Gennany, EUR+  EUR12 incl. Unified Gennany
Latest budget estimates point to afigure of8.3% ofGDP. (b)
Establishing sound and sustainable public finances is a central goal of all the convergence
programmes; all of them set medium-term targets for deficit reduction, generally aiming
to respect the 3% of GDP deficit target by 1996 (see Box 2) and to stabilize the debt
ratio and then put it on a declining trend. So far there has been a significant shortfall in
The criteria of the government financial position is defined in the Treaty on E1.l1'opean Union in
absolute tenus (art. 104 c para 2 and art. 2 of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure). The
ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product should not exceed a
reference value of 3% of GDP, unless either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously
and reached a level that comes close to the reference value; or, alternatively, the excess over the
reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference
value.
The level of gross government debt must not exceed 60% of GDP or must be sufficiently
diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.achieving the fiscal targets of the programmes (except for the United Kingdom whose
convergence programme was presented relatively recently). For the most part these
shortfalls are not due to an absence of adjustment effort; most of the governments have
introduced successive budgetary adjustment packages at least on the scale of those
initially envisaged as necessary. Instead, budgetary plans have been blown off-course by
the unexpected growth slowdown, and in some cases by higher interest rates in 1992.
The pre-1993 convergence programmes were, in general, far too optimistic about growth
prospects. By 1994 the level of GDP in Germany and Spain is likely to be about 8-
lower than projected in those countries' convergence programmes , and cumulative
shortfalls of over 6% are probable for Belgium, Italy and Portugal. These much weaker
growth paths have inevitably meant lower tax revenues, rising expenditure shares and
higher deficits through the working .of the automatic stabilisers. These. shortfalls increase
the scale of the budgetary adjustment effort which has to be undertaken in the next few
years.
Box 2: The public finance block of the convergence programmes
The table presented below .allows a comparison between the targets of the convergence
programmes with the performance realised in 1992 and 1993..
A comparison has to take into account that the convergence programmes have been
submitted in a very different economic situation. In particular, the underlying
assumptions of the convergence programmes have proved to be much too optimistic in
view of the actual economic developements. Economic growth had to be revised
downwards generally and real interest rates were higher than assumed in some cases.
Nevertheless, the convergence programmes show the clear commitment of Member
States to achieve medium term consolidation.(Box 2 cont.)
Comparison of convergence programme (CP) projections of budget deficit and
outmrns for 1992 and 1993
General government net borrowing (unless otherwise stated)
in%ofGDP
CountrY Datela) I 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Belgium
6/92
CP revised 4/93
Outtum ll/93 7.4
Germany
CP (b) 10/91
Outturn (b) 6/93
Outtum ll/93
Greece
2/93 4.4 1.6(c)
Outturn ll/93 13. 15.
Spain
4/92 1.8 1.0
Outtum ll/93
Ireland
10/91
Outturn ll/93
Italy
CP (d) 10/91 8.4 5.5
CP revised (d) 9/92 10. 7.3
Ollttum (d) ll/93 10.
Olltturn ll/93 10.
Netherlands
4/92 3.5 2.4
Ollttum 11/93
Portllgal
10/91 (e) (1) (1) (1)
Ollttum 11193
United Kingdom 
CP (g) 5/93 5.50 75 (h)
Ollttum ll/93
(a) Date wh~ the converg~ce prognunme (or its revision) was submitted, $lid of latest Conunission services  for the outtum
(Autumn 1993).
(b) Public authorities  financial deficit
(c) Thedeticit is  projected to decline to 0.8% ofGDP in 1997 and 0.2% in 1998.
(d) Slate sector  borrowing requicemenl
(e) In the budget for  1992 and 1993 the oflicial1argets were let at  2%  and 4.2% of GDP, respectively, which was claimed to be
conJPRtible, on an annualized basis, with the targets of the convergence programme for these years.
(f) Average deficit  in the three years 1993 to  1995.
(g) Financial years  ending in March of the following calendar year.
(11) The deficit is projected to decline to 4% ofGDP in the 1997-98 fmancial year.A need for further and in some cases intensified budgetary consolidation exists in almost
every Community Member State. Appropriate measures to achieve fiscal consolidation
are better implemented during a period of sound economic growth. During a cyclical
downturn the question arises to what extent the automatic stabilizers should be allowed
to work. Indeed, the deterioration in the fiscal position is also due to the economic cycle
as table 3 shows.
Analysing the impact of the cycle on the budget balance is useful for understanding
budgetary developments, particularly during periods of recession, but estimation of the
cyclical component is subject to some uncertainties and the figures in the final column of
table 3 should be interpreted as broad orders of magnitude rather than precise estimates.
Table 3: Cumulative changes ofthe general government deficits, 1990-93 (b)
General government Cumulative change 1990-93, in % of GDP
deficit
in %.ofGDP Change in Change in cyclical
1993 actual deficit comoonent
7.4 1.6
1.6
WD (a) 1.7 1.4
D(a)
15. 0.4
IRL 1.7
10. -0. 1.8
1.1
3.4
6.4
EUR- (a) 2.4
EURHa)
(b)
Commission services, economicforecaat (Autumn  1993)
WD  West Germany, D 
'" 
Unified Germany
EUR-  EUR12 incl. WeatGermany, EUR+  EURl2 incl. Unified Germany
The approach to calculate the cyclically-adjusted deficit c01l3ista of taking into account a reference
path feJr GDP calculated by estimating a mean trend for GDP over the cycles. The change in the
cyclical companent measures the budgetary impact of changes in the output gap relative teJ trend and
interest payments on public debt are not taken into account in the cyclical component.
Source:
(a)
That a large part of the worsening in budget deficits has been induced by the recession
should not be a reason for complacency. The distinction between actual and cyclically-
adjusted deficits is made difficult by the fact that some cyclical factors could become
structural (mainly through hysteresis phenomena in the labour market i.e. a downward
rigidity in the unemployment rate) and that growing interest-rate payments tend to
increase the consolidation needs in terms of non-interest expenditure.The developments in primary balances (i.e. budgetary balances excluding interest
payments) provide evidence on the determination of governments to reduce their
deficits. Most Member States with large budgetary disequilibria actually have primary
surpluses, clearly indicating that measures have been taken to consolidate in those areas
where room for manoeuvre exists.
Table 4: Primary balance of Member States for 1990-93
Primary balance (b) m.: interest
paymenu
in % of GDP in % ofGDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1993
ILl
7.5
WD (8) -0. -0.
D (a) -0.5 -0. 3.5
-6. -0.5 15.
-0. 1.2 -0.4
1.4 1.0 -0.5
IRL
1.3 1.9 12.
-0.4 1.9 1.7
1.3
-4.
EJJR- (a) 0.4 -0.
EUR+ (a) -0.
Source:
(a)
Commission services, economicforecast (Autumn  1993)
WD  West Germany,  D =  Unified Germany
EUR-  EURl1 incl. West Germany, EUR+  EURl1 incl. Unified Germany
General government balance excluding interest payments (surplus  deficit-)
(b)
Such efforts have been particularly marked in Italy where the primary balance has
improved by 3.3 percentage points ofGDP in the period 1990-93. In Greece, the primary
deficit has been significantly reduced. Although the primary surplus is decreasing, it
remains significant in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. Portugal too has
been able to keep the primary balance in surplus until 1992. Conversely, in Spain, France
and the United Kingdom primary deficits have widened. All in all, given continued
commitment to fiscal consolidation there are grounds to believe that government deficits
will be size-ably reduced once the current recession is overcome and if interest rates
continue to fall.
Nevertheless, in general the primary surpluses have not been enough to reduce or
stabilize the government debt level (see below). In particular the combination of a high
level of government debt and high interest rates has led to increasing interest payments
which exceed 10% of GDP in a number of countries. Even some countries with a
relatively moderate debt level are now confronted by an historically high level ofinterest
payments (Denmark, Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain and the Netherlands).Although government debt levels and thus the interest burden have in the long run mainly
to be reduced by operating on the primary surplus, the need to achieve sustainable
budgetary positions through significant primary surpluses is an economically, socially and
politically difficult challenge. A high primary surplus could worsen the structure of
expenditures, in particular if public investment is reduced, or could create social strains
and lead to unwarranted income distribution effects. In any case, the need for a high
primary surplus to ensure debt sustainabilityimplies a greater wlnerability in the public
finances to domestic and extemalshocks. Reducing the interest burden through lowering
the stock of debt and lower long-term interest rates are also important for successfully
achieving medium-term fiscal consolidation.
Table 5: Gross general government debt of Member States 1990-
Gross general government debt
in % of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993
128. 129. 131.9 138.4
66.4 71.7 73.4 78.
WD (a) 43.
D (a) 41.9 44. 50.
95. 100. 106. 113.
44. 45. 48. 55.
35. 35. 39. 44.
IRL 96. 95. 91.6 92.
97. 101.4 108. 115.
10.
78. 79. 79. 83.
68.4 67. 63. 69.
39. 41.0 47. 53.
EUR- (a) 57.
EUR+(~) 58. 61.7 66.4
Reference value 60. 60. 60. 60.
Source:
(a)
Notes:
Belgium:
Denmark:
Germany:
Greece:
Spain:
France:
Ireland:
Italy:
Luxembourg:
Netherlands:
Portugal: 
United Kingdom:
Commission services, based on figures presented by Member States
WD  West Germany, D  Unified Germany
EUR-  EURl2 incl. West Germany, EUR+  EURl2 incl. Unified Germany
Consolidated central and local government debt; social security debt not included.
Central govemment short-term liabilities not included; general government not c()l/3olidated
Gross consolidated general govemment debt at nominal value
General government not consolidated; Central bank's direct advances not included.
General government not consolidated.
Gross consolidated general government debt, excluding trade credits and accounts payable and
receivable, at nominal value
Central government (Exchequer)
Gross consolidated general government debt at nominal value.
Social security debt not included; general guvernment debt not consolidated.
Gross consolidated general guvernment debt at nominal value.
Central government and certain autonomous funds; debt of social security and local authorities
notincluded.
Valuation of debt at market prices.The developments in government debt levels mainly reflect past behaviour of public
finances, real growth, and inflation. Five Member States (Germany, Spain, France
Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom) have had a gross government debt-to-GDP ratio
below 60% throughout stage 1. However, in all of these .countries the debt ratio is now
deteriorating. Ireland and Portugal made considerable progress in reducing their debt
ratio until 1992. Denmark has reduced its debt ratio considerably in the 1980s, but a
rising trend emerged in the 1990s. In Belgium, Greece and Italy the government debt to
GDP ratio debt is again rising fast and stands at a very high level (above 100% ofGDP).
Gross general government debt figures presented in Table 5 are not yet in most cases in
full accordance with the definitional requirements laid down in Article 2 of the Protocol
on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union, nor with
the detailed definition of debt laid down in the forthcoming Council regulation on the
application of the provisions of the above mentioned Protocol.
For Table 5, the Commission services chose among the gross debt series available in the
Member States the definition which they view as the closest to the Treaty definition.
Therefore the figures in table 5 are only indicative and cannot be formally 
retained as
benchmarks for comparison with the reference value of the Treaty's criterion on public
debt6)
3 Balance of current account
Although different in nature from the explicit convergence variables dealt with in the
Treaty, current account developments remain important indicators of the economic
performance of a country. However, in integrating economies like in the European
Community the interpretation of current account developments is becoming more
difficult, in particular the financing aspects of current account imbalances lose most of
their significance in the presence of fully liberalized capital movements. Rather then
aiming at current account equilibrium as a target of economic policy the issue is the
appropriateness of the external position within the overall economic performance of a
particular economy.
In any individual Member State, the balance on the current account reflects conditions in
the real economy. If unemployment is relatively high or productivity is relatively low,
policies to improve the productive potential of the economy could be associated with the
emergence of a current account deficit, as capital flows in from abroad to take up
provitable investment opportunities. In such a case, the deficit would be a positive
development as imported capital is used to temporarily alleviate the constraint imposed
on the level of domestic investment by the level of national savings. As activity level in
the domestic economy increases, the deficit would be expected to be self-correcting.
6) With the coming into force of the second stage towards EMU on I January 1994, Member States
will produce government debt data which meet the detailed definition of the Council regulation
and will report them to the Commission with specific infonnation, like the financing of public
enterprises through issuance of government debt.In a similar vein, the emergence of a current account surplus need not necessarily reflect
positive supply conditions in a Member State economy. If the profitability of domestic
investment opportunities is perceived to be relatively low, capital may flow out of the
economy in search of higher returns abroad, resulting in reduced levels of domestic
acti'lity and the emergence of a current account surplus.
Graph 3: Balance of current transactions, EC, 1980..93
in %of GDP
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Source: Commls8lon services, economic  forecast  (Autumn 1900)
While these considerations have increased in their importance now that progress has been
achieved in liberalizing capital movements, traditional factors explaining current account
trends still remain important too. Important changes in competitiveness at both the world
level and between Community Member States have influenced trade flows and the public
sector has been (partly) offsetting the saving-investment beha'liour of the private sector
by an anti-cyclical beha'liour.
The current account balance of the Community was in deficit in the aftermath of the
second oil price shock. However, the deficit of around 1% of GDP in 1980 was
transformed into a surplus of above 1% ofGDP in 1986. There were both external and
domestic reasons for such a .turnaround. As regards the external environment, the policy
choice taken by the USA, which stimulated Community exports via a depreciation
against the dollar, the fall in oil prices and the relatively high growth abroad must be
singled out. Domestically, demand was subdued in the Community, mainly because of
the efforts to consolidate public finances (e.g. in Germany) and the need to improve
financial conditions in the private sector (e.g. in France at the enterprise level).
The year of 1986 marked a turning point in current account at the Community level.
Starting in the United Kingdom and Denmark (1984) investment activities improved
substantially in Spain and France in 1985/86, followed by all other Member States untilTable 6: Balance on current transactions of Member States 1990-
Balance on aarrent transactions
in % ofGDP 
1990 1991 1992 1993
1.7 1.8 1.3
1.4
WD (a) 1.4 1.6 0.4
D (a) -0. 1.3 1.2
-6. -4.
-0. -0.
IRL -0. 3.4(b)
1.4 1.8
34. 28. 27. 25.
pee)
-4. 1.8
EUR-(a) -0. -0. -0. -0.
EUR+(a) 1.1 1.1 -0.
(b)
(c)
Commission services, economicforecast (Autumn  1993)
WD  West Germany,  D =  Unified Germany
EUR-  EUR12 incl. West Germany, EUR+  EUR1l incl. Unified Germany
In notional accOl/nf3 definition thefigurefor  1993  is equivalent to  1%  ofGDP.
Break in the series  1991-92: - 1991:  notional accmmf3 figures
from  1992  onwards: balonce of payments
Source:
(a)
the end of the decade. The decline in the current account surplus was thus a reflection of
private sector optimism and ofa high rate of growth and job creation and therefore no
reason of concern. The swing in private .sector saving was even greater than reflected in
the current account balance as the net borrowing of general 
government narrowed
substantially (by more than 2% of GDP) in that period.
Although current account developments are not uniform across Member States during
the period 1990 to 1993, some common features can be identified. A rising current
account surplus emerged in those countries where domestic demand was particularly
depressed and unemployment rising e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France and Ireland.
Nevertheless, until 1992 competitiveness was improving gradually in these countries due
to the positive development of domestic costs. The relatively large current account
deficits prevailing in Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom were partly due to the real
appreciation of their currencies during the phase of economic upswing; in these
countries the current account deficit was also reduced temporarily because of depressed
private sector demand. More recently some of those Member States which depreciated
substantially relative to other Community countries show some reduction in the current
account deficit (Spain, Italy).
The most significant change in the current account balance has occurred in Germany as a
consequence of unification. The large drop observed in the aftermath of unification was
a reflection of the large gap between demand and supply in Germany at that time. While
the East German production potential became largely obsolete, reducing supply, demandwas stimulated by large transfers and rapid wage increases. However, the persistence of a
current account deficit of around 1% of GDP during the :recent recession is no longer
explainable only by the shock of unification. The deterioration in competitiveness and
continued weak foreign demand are becoming more dominant factors.
All in all, current account developments during the 1990s highlight some less positive
developments. Firstly, current account deficits went hand in hand with a substantial
decline in investment activities throughout the Community and, more recently, also of
private consumption. Secondly, while private sector saving is increasing, deficits in the
public sector are growing rapidly. Thirdly, competitiveness of the Community economy
appears to be much less promising, than was the case in the second half of the 1980s.
The present current account situation of the Community as a whole may thus be an
indicator of low growth prospects and further rising unemployment. The need for
policies geared to improve competitiveness, in particular through structural reform, is
evident.
4 Long-term interest rates
In line with progress in reducing inflation, the Community average long-term interest :rate
fell ftom an exceptionally high level of 15% in 1981 to about 9% in 1988. A tightening 
monetary policy, coupled with financial markets unease at inflationary prospects in post-
unification Germany and temporary fears of world capital shortage, resulted in a reversal
of this favourable trend in 1988. Since 1990, however, there has been another general
easing in long-term interest rates so that the Community average is currently about 8%
which mainly reflects a decline in inflation expectations.
Graph 4: Long term interest rates, 1980..
in%
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Souroe: Commission  services,  economic forecast (Autumn  1993)Table 7: Interest rate performance of Member States 1990-
Long-term interest rate (b) Benchmark
government bonds
1990 1991 1992 1993 10 years (9/93)
10.
11. 10. 10.
WD(a)
D(a) 6.3
14. 12.4 12. 10.
IRL 10.
13.4 13. 13. 11.3
16. 17. 15. 12.4 10.
11.1
EUR- (a) 11. 10.
EUR+ (a) 10.
Reference ranl!e 11.0 - 13. 11.2 -12. 10.6 -12. 7 - 10.
(a)
(b)
Commission slirviclis licimomic forlicast t'futumn  1993)
Thli thrlili blist piirforming Mlimblir Statlis in inflation arli uslid to calculatli thli rlijerlincli rangli by assuming that of
thlisli thrlili, thli countrtlis with thli lowlist and highlist long-tlirm intlirlist ratli dlitlirnlinli thli rlifrrlincli rangli.
WD  Wlist Germany,  D =  Unifilid Glirmany
EUR-  EUR12 incl. WIiSt Glirnlany, EUR+  EUR12 incL Unifilid Glirmany
A comparison blitwlilin countrtlis is not liasilypossiblll as thli rupliCtiVli dlljinitions are diffirlint:
B: Clintral govlirnmlint bonds (ovlir  Yliars  slicondary marTret)
DK: Statli and mortgagli bonds
D:  Public slictor bonds outstanding (monthly avliraglis)
GR: Clintralgovlirnmlint bonds
E: ClintralgoVlirnmlintbonds at 2yt1ars and ovlir (sincli 01.88)
F: Clintral govlirnmlint bonds:  to 10 ytlars
IRL  Clintral govlirnmlint bonds:  15  Yliars
I: Public slictor bonds outstanding (sincli 01.92)
NL: Yilild of5 statli bonds with thli longlist maturity (monthly avliragli) (sincli 01.85)
P: Bonds ovlir  ytlars (wliightlid avliragli of public and privatli)
UK: Bonds 20 ytlars (lind-ol-month)
EUR: Avliragli of12 countrilis using GDP wliights
Sourcli:
The trend in long-term interest rates has been characterized by a general decline in levels
across the Community and a significant convergence among Member States.
Convergence in long-term interest rates has been due mainly to a successful disinflation
process in several Member States and illustrates the high degree of financial integration
achieved in the Community as a result of the single market programme. Convergence is
being achieved at a relatively low level of long rates reflecting moderate inflationary
expectations to which the prospect of a period of slow growth is also contributing.
Assessment of convergence in long-term interest rates in the precise terms of the Treaty
requirements?) is currently hampered by the lack of homogeneity in the reported interest
The reference value on the convergence of interest rates referred in the Treaty (article 1O9j of the
Treaty and article 4 of the protocol on the convergence criteria) means that the criterion is satisfied
if a Member State has bad an average nominallong-tenn interest rate that does not exceed by more
than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price
stability. Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of long tenn government bonds or
comparable securities, taking into account differences in national definitions.rates as displayed in table 7. Interest rates on benchmark 10 years government bonds are
also included in the table; however, in some Member States the market for these bonds is
still very thin or virtually non-existent. With this caveat in mind, the table shows, based
on the long-term interest rate in the three best-performing Member States in terms of
inflation in 1993 (Denmark, France and the Netherlands) a reference range of 8.7 to
10.9%. Most other countries have long rates below the upper limit of the reference
range.
The evolution in long-term interest rates has become less predictable as the ERM
tramework, which had contributed to a convergence in long rates, has been weakened
(see next section). While the widened fluctuation margins persist exchange-rate discipline
will no longer be assured by a known tight mechanism so that financial markets will
determine the level and trend in longer-term interest rates by more direct reference to the
counter-inflationary credibility ofthe policy mix (reflecting the inter-relationship between
the inflation and public finance criteria) in each Member State.
The emergence of risk premia on long rates will only be avoided if Member States remain
credibly committed to the achievement of nominal convergence .and pursue monetary and
fiscal policies consistent with these objectives.
5 Exchange-rate stability in the ERM
Since mid-1992, the EMS has experienced a series of crises which has fundamentally
altered its operation as a tramework for monetary-policy co-ordination in the
Community. The source of difficulti~s in the EMS can be traced back to late 1980s. In
this period, a growing political momentum towards economic and monetary integration
transformed the EMS trom a system of "fixed but adjustable" exchange-rate parities into
a system with no realignments. The political commitment to unchanged EMS parities
was facilitated in economic terms by a relatively high growth rate in the Community .
economy, which concealed the emergence of a cumulative divergence in economic
performance among Member States. Inflation rates in some Member States remained
higher than in others leading to an accumulated real appreciation of their currencies. In
several Member States serious budgetary imbalances were not tackled. Most
importantly, however, the unification of Germany had resulted in an asymmetric demand
shock to its domestic economy, setting in train a real appreciation of the DM; this, in
turn, changed the impact of the DM as anchor currency in the EMS.
Initially, the Community had benefited trom the increased export growth associated with
higher German demand but strains began to emerge trom mid-1991 when the
Bundesbank gradually tightened monetary policy in response to an acceleration in the
German inflation rate.  Ai;  the DM the anchor currency - strengthened in response to
tighter monetary conditions, the commitment to fixed exchange rates within the ERM
forced other Member States to pursue a monetary policy which was too strict in relation
to conditions in their domestic economy.
By this time, the demand boom of the late 1980s had petered out and economic activity
was already slowing down across the Community.  Ai;  economic conditions became moredifficult, the consequence of the divergent economic performance among Member States
was thrown into sharp relief. With growth already slipping below trend and, in some
cases, budgetary imbalances deteriorating rapidly, financial markets began to question the
ability of Member States to sustain the costs of maintaining exchange-rate stability
through the pursuit of the tight monetary stance necessitated by inflationary pressures in
Germany. The appreciation of the DM (and hence other ERMcurrencies) vis-a-vis the
dollar as a consequence of widening short-term interest-rate differentials further added to
the difficulties of many Member States.
In a period in which welcome progress was being made in the liberalization of capital
movements, the increasing inconsistency between political aspirations to fixed exchange
rates and underlying economic realities was potentially highly destabilizing. Free capital
movement within the Community was an integral element of the Single Market
programme and by 1990...1991 most Community countries had already eliminated
controls on cross-border capital movements. Liberalized capital movements together
with deregulation and innovation in financial markets (not only in the Community but in
most industrialized countries), led to remarkable globalization of portfolio investments
during the last decad~. The increase in cross-border holdings, coupled with factors such
as i) technological advances in dissemination of information ii) the introduction of new
derivatives ill) increased institutionalization of savings and iv) concentration of
investment decisions in the hands of professional managers, has created the potential for
huge and volatile capital flows between currencies if investors lose confidence in any
given exchange rate. The efficiency of foreign exchange markets has undoubtedly been
enhanced by capital liberalization but market participants have become much more
powerful vis- vis central banks than was the case during the early years of the ERM.
In the context of liberalized capital markets, the mix of unchanged nominal exchange
rates, inadequate economic convergence and difference in cyclical economic position set
the scene for exchange-rate instability if economic policies underlying ERM parities are
not seen to be consistent. Inconsistencies clearly existed but were ignored by financial
markets so long as the EMU project - implying economic discipline on aspirant
participants to ultimately validate their unchangedERM parities by appropriate policy
adjustments - remained unquestioned. Indeed, the pre-crisis period was characterized by
capital inflows into high yielding currencies, such as the lira, sterling, peseta and escudo
in so-called "convergence plays" using these currencies as profitable proxies for the DM.
However, financial market fears in the face of these inconsistencies emerged strongly
following the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June 1992 and the
uncertainty created by the French decision to hold a referendum on the treaty in
September. These events caused a major correction in the financial markets' expectations
on EMU. In consequence, the markets began to question the wisdom of their portfolio
positions in high-yielding currencies: the so-called "convergence plays" began to unwind
as institutions sought to protect themselves against newly-perceived devaluation risks.
The ensuing period of eighteen months was characterized by repeated bouts of market
" . 
pressure on ERM currencies as huge amounts of capital flowed between currencies
primarily into the DM. The severity of pressure resulted in a sequence of adjustments
within the ERM, involving the withdrawal of two currencies from the system, fiverealignments involving four currencies and ultimately in early August 1993 the temporary
widening of fluctuation margins to +/-15%.
The widening ofERM bands implies a major change of regime in monetary co-operation
in the Community. A system of quasi-fixed exchange rates has been temporarily replaced
by a system allowing. in principle. greater flexibility in exchange rate movements within
wide bands. The weakening of exchange-rate discipline within the ERM represents 
setback to the integration process within the Community as previously envisaged but. in
the present circumstances, wider ERM bands are the most pragmatic response to the
recurrent tensions on the foreign-exchange markets. Tbe EMS remains in existence in a
modified form, while speculative pressure on the ERM grid has been significantly eased.
Despite the potential for differentiated monetary policies within the modified EMS. there
has been no dramatic adjustment in the monetary stance in Member States since the
beginning of August. The cautious approach to interest-rate reductions that has been
adopted reflects a desire to maintain a commitment within the Community to monetary
co-operation based on stable exchange rates. In consequence, exchange-rate movements
within the ERM have been rather limited.
Any effort to re-establish narrow bands without improved economic convergence among
Member States would almost certainly not be accepted by the financial markets and
would incite renewed speculative attacks on the ERM grid. The experience of the recent
crises has demonstrated that a necessary condition for exchange-rate stability is achieved
by the pursuit of credible and consistent economic policies designed to foster economic
convergence in conditions of economic growth . while focusing on the fundamentals of
price stability and sound public finances.
Real convergence
1 Introduction
A13 regards real convergence this report distinguishes three aspects: (i) catching-up in
real income i.e. the narrowing of differences in .standards of living. (ii) unemployment
performances and finally (iii) convergence in general supply performances.
The catching-up process made significant progress during the 1980s. Average income
grew faster than theEC average in Spain. Ireland and Portugal. but not in Greece.
However. the current recession is limiting the possibility of fast rising per capita income
in the countries concerned. Nevertheless, as long as competitiveness is kept under
control. these countries should be able to achieve a higher growth trend r~lative to
Community partner countries.
The Community is still faced by large differences in unemployment levels. This not only
concerns differences between Member States but also unacceptably large discrepancies
existing within individual countries (e.g. in Germany. Greece. Spain and Italy). Reducing
these differences is important in finding a socially acceptable balance as integration
proceeds. Otherwise regional challenges will grow. Creating new jobs through
investment is an essential means to reduce unemployment.Following the liberalization of capital movements investment is now likely to take place
in those areas where the expected rate of return is highest. Creating improved supply
conditions through structural reform and establishing favourable and durable
expectations for a competitive real rate of return are decisive to cope with thechallertge
of unemployment. The successful implementation of the internal market is contributing to
the improvement ofsupply conditions within the Community. During the 19808 there has
been an improving trend in profit margins. Even more encouraging is that in the current
recession the deterioration in profitability has been relatively modest compared with
earlier cyclical downswings.
2 Catching-up in real income
The achievement of real convergence is a central goal of Community policies. Just as
with nominal convergence, achievirtg real convergence is the responsibility of each
Member State. However Community policies, e.g. the structural Funds and the Cohesion
Fund, contribute importantly to this process.
In a strict sense real convergence means the narrowing in the differencies in standards of
living across regions. .AB the mobility of labour is expected to remain limited during the
Europearl. integration process, it is equally important that large differences in
unemployment between countries are avoided.
During the 1980s the conditions for a successful catching-up process in the Community
have improved. Greater integration improved the scope for division of labour so that
each country could exploit more successfully its comparative advantages. The
liberalization of capital movements further enhanced the conditions for catching-up as it
alleviated the external constraint on financing investment. In the presence of favourable
opportunities, both foreign and domestic investment have taken place on a large scale.
In addition, greater macroeconomic stability contributed to attracting foreign investments
to the catching-up Member States, e.g. Spain, Ireland and Portugal.
Nevertheless, catching-up does not depend only upon economic conditions in the country
in question. In general, catching-up is facilitated in an environment of favourable growth
in the Community as a whole or even worldwide. Since investment is the cyclically most
volatile demand component, catching-up Member States might be most hit by recession
as investment is cut back. Low demand might increase fears of over-capacity arl.d initial
expectations of a high rate of return might be reduced, increasing pessimism about
economic prospects. Moreover, recession enhances the risk of slower economic
integration if countries try to protect domestic sectors.
During the 19808 the standard of living in the European Community has increased
remarkably. Real GDP per head was around 25% higher at the end of the decade
compared with 1980. After modest growth at the beginning of the decade
, the growth
rate accelerated to 3% per year on average in the second half of the decade. The average
growth rate in the EC (2.3%) during the 1980s was only marginally below that of the
USA (2.5%) but considerably below the growth rate in Japan (4.
2%).Graph 6: Aeal GDP/head of population, EC., 1980-93
PPs; index: 1987=100
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Table 8 shows that there are still wide differences between Member States as far as GDP
per head is concerned, measured in terms of purcbasingpower standards . While a
group of richer countries exceeds the Community average by about 10% (Denmark,
France, Luxembourg), Greece only reaches 48% of the average income level. However
there has been an important boost to catching-up in Spain and Portugal since their
accession to the Community in 1986. While in these countries GDP per head was only
70% and 51% of the Community average in 1985 respectively, in 1993 they stand at
78% and 62%. Ireland also went through a similarly successful catching-up process
narrowing the gap in income level ftom the Community average by more than 
percentage points in the last decade. In contrast, Greece has fallen back by 3 percentage
points over this period.
As regards the richer countries, France (in the second half of the 1980s) and the United
Kingdom (in the first half of the 19808) have improved their relative position in the
Community, white Denmark (in the second half of the 1980s) and the Netherlands (over
the whole period) have experienced a relative decline. Luxembourg was able to extend
its top position, meanwhile Belgium and Italy remained slightly above the Community
average. The relative position of Germany is strongly affected by unification. While the
standard of living in West Germany was second highest in 1990, unified Germany is in
4th position, with an average income level only slightly higher than wider Community
average.
8) Purchasing power standards (PPS) allow a comparison of GDP per head because it takes 
into
account the price level in each Member State and excludes short-term exchange rate fluctuations.Table 8: GDP per head of population in Member States
(according to purchasing power standards)
GDP per head of population
Index: EUR- = 100
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
106. 103. 104. 104.9 104. 103.
105. 113. 106. 107.4 107. 108.
WI) (a) l1S. 119. 117. 119. 119. 117.
D(a)
102. 104. 104.1
52. 51.0 47. 47.4 47. 47.
71.6 70. 75. 77. 77. 77.
113. 112. 110. 110. 111.0 110.
IRL 62. 63. 71.3 72. 75. 77.0
102.3 102. 102. 102. 103.1 103.
115.3 119. 126. 127. 128. 129.
10S. 105.3 101.9 100.4 100.5 100.
52. 51.2 55. 58. 62. 62.
97.5 101.0 101.3 95.5 94.
EUR- (a) 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.
EUR+ (a)
97. 97.
Source:
(0)
Commission services, economic fon!CfJ1lt (Autumn  1993)
WD  West Germany,  D =  Unified Germany
EUR- =EUR12 incl. West Germany. EUR+ =EUR12 incl. Unified Germany
3 Unemployment
Reducing unemployment was a big challenge among European countries during the last
decade. The following graph shows that unemployment in the Community rose steadily
from 6% in 1980 to a peak level of 10.8% in 1985. During the second half ofthe 1980s
unemployment fell, approximately to the level of 1982. All Member States made
considerable progress in creating jobs .in the second half of the 1980s. Employment
growth even exceeded 3% per year for a few years in a row e.
g. in Spain in 1987-
Luxembourg in 1988- , the United Kingdom in 1988-89 and to a somewhat lesser
extent in West Germany after unification. For the Community as a whole 
employment
grew by about 1.5% in the 
high growth years 1987-89. Employment growth was
however, relatively low or even negative in Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Portugal
during the second half of the 1980s.
Although still higher than in the trough of the early 19808, employment is now falling by
more than 11/2 % per year. Indeed, the early 19908 are witnessing a renewed and very
significant deterioration in the labour market situation. Within three years (1991-
93) the
unemployment rate has risen by 3 percentage points, back to the peak level of the mid
1980s.Graph 6: Unemployment rate, EC, 1980-
In % of civilian labour force
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Source: Commls$Jon services, economic fOff3Cest (Autumn  1993)
Table 9: Unemployment rates of Member States
Unemployment rate (b)
% of civilian labour force
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
11.
10.5
WD (a)
D(a)
11. 21.6 16. 16. 18. 21.2
10. 10. 10.
:mL 18. 14. 16. 17. 18.4
10. 10. 10. 11.0
1.7 1.6 1.9
10.5
11. 10. 10.
EUR- (a) 10. 10.
EUR+ (8) 9.5 10.
Source:
(a)
Commission services, economicforecast (Autumn  1993)
WD  West Gennany,  D =  Unified Gennany
EUR-  UR12 incl. West Gennany, EUR+  EUR12 incl. Unified Germany
EUROSTAT definition (b)
Although the levels of unemployment were very different, almost all Member States
witnessed a .similar profile in unemployment with a peak in 1985 and a declining trend
thereafter. Some countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UnitedKingdom) achieved lower rates of unemployment at the end of the decade than at the
beginning while unemployment was higher in Germany, Spain and France. Italy
unemploymenet rate was on a rising but contained trend over the last decade and was
characterized by weaker cyclical fluctuations than most of the other Member States.
Unemployment rates are extraordinarily high in Spain and Ireland.
Table 9 illustrates that large differences in rates of unemployment are prevailing at the
beginning of the 1990s. Unemployment rates in 1993 are around 7-8% in Germany
(unified), Greece, and the Netherlands but about 20% in Spain and Ireland. Belgium,
Denmark, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have unemployment rates between 9
and 11%. In Portugal the unemployment rate has been increasing :ITom 4.1% (1991) to
2% (1993).
Convergence in supply performance
2.4.1 Convergence of supply conditions matters
European economic integration, in particular when the internal market has been put in
place, should go together with a high degree of convergence in supply performance
between Community Member States. The co-existence of liberalised capital movements
and continued limitations on mobility within the European labour market makes
convergence in supply conditions even more important.
Differences in supply conditions among Member States, globally measured by the
expected rate of return on physical capital, will influence private sector investment
decisions. A region (country) in which the (expected) marginal real rate of return on
capital is inferior to that of other regions would suffer. Investment and, therefore, job
creation would take place elsewhere and the result would be regional unemployment.
As investment decisions depend upon expectations (i.e. what really matters is the
expected real rate of return), it is important to establish a high degree of micro-economic
credibility i.e. markets should be flexible enough to sustain a sufficient real rate of return.
A lack of supply-side credibility in a given Member State would result in a micro-
economic risk premium, which would require a real rate of return superior to that of
other countries. The credibility of any micro-economic regime depends upon various
factors among which the operation of the labour market, commitment to market openess
and competition, the taxation system and inftastructural conditions are most important.
A detailed analysis of all these aspects is beyond the scope of this report. However, the
link between macro-economic performance and the supply side is obvious. Structural
reforms at the Member State level aimed at improving the functioning of markets and
supported by the implementation of the internal market programme are a crucial element
in this context. Market participants will have greater concerns about the sustainability of
macro-economic and exchange-rate commitments if they doubt the ability of economies
to respond flexibly to the type of disturbances that are likely to occur.On a macro-economic level, wages, real unit labour costs and investment profitability are
the important determinants of the supply side performance of a country, while micro-
economic flexibility is difficult to measure empirically.
Wage developments have a pivotal role to play not only in the process of .convergence
and in sustaining macro-economic stability but also in revitalising an .etnployment-
creating growth trend in the Community at the present time. A certain degree of wage
moderation has been experienced recently but continued moderation is warranted given
the high and rising rate of unemployment.
An effective response to the latter problem necessitates a rise in the investment ratio in
order to increase the Community's growth potential. A rise in investment is dependent on
actions in a number of areas including measures to improve investment profitability. The
latter can be ameliorated through an appropriate evolution of real unit labour costs
which, in turn, is an amalgam of real wage and productivity developments.
Over the period 1982-1989 a strong adjustment took place in the overall macroeconomic
evolution of wages in relation to productivity which contributed strongly to the
improvement in the general environment for investment, employment and growth.
Annual rates of growth in real compensation per employee, while still remaining positive,
grew at moderate rates in relation to productivity. This pattern of real incomes growing
at rates lower than that of productivitiy was consequently reflected in a continuous
decline in real unit labour costs (RULCs) (see .Box 3) over the period.
The decline in RULCs was the single most important factor in boosting the profitability
of capital (i.e. the rate of return on fixed capital) which rose steadily in the 1980s trom
the low point reached in 1981 of less than 70% of the average of the, quasi fuU-
Graph 7: ReaR unit labour costs, EC (a,b) , 1980-
total economy
Index: 1987=100
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Total economy
Real unit labour eost8; total eeonolllY (b)
Index: 1987-100
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
107. 102. 96. 98. 98. 100.
106.1 97. 96. 95. 95. 96.
WD (a) 104. 100. 95. 95. 96. 96.
D(a)
97. 107. 102. 95. 94. 92.
113. 103. 98. 97. 98. 98.
107. 104. 96. 97. 97. 96.
:mL 113. 102. 97. 98. 98.5 99.4
103. 103. 100. 101.0 100. 98.
105. 96. 99. 102. 102.2 105.
109.1 96. 94. 95. 97. 98.
114. 104. 94. 95. 94. 94.
105. 100. 105. 106. 106.4 103.
EUR- (a,c) 107.7 102. 98. 98.5 98.4 97.
EUR+ (a c)
Source: Commission services, economic/oncast (Autumn  1993)
(a) WD  West Germany,  D =  Unified Germany
EUR- 
== 
EUR1l incl. West Germany, EUR+  EUR1l incl. Unified Germany
(b) Nominal uniOabour coats deflated by the  GDP  price deflator.
(c) PPS weighted
employment, period 1961-73 to over 90% in 1990. In addition to the decline in RULCs
the improvement in profitability was assisted by a slight improvement in capital
productivity which emanated essentially ITom a strong rise in capacity utilisation.
The overall improvement in profitability more than compensated for the higher real long-
term interest rates prevailing in the 1980s, compared with the previous decade, and
provided the basis for an upturn in gross fixed capital formation which underpinned a
durable and strong recovery in output and employment over the period.
A comparative analysis reveals that the decline in RULCs, and consequent improvement
in profit margins occurred in almost all countries (table 10). It was most pronounced in
the catching-up countries Spain, Ireland and Portugal, but Belgium, West Germany,
France and the the Netherlands also improved their profitability more than other
countries up to 1989. Italy and in particular the United Kingdom have not succeeded in
improving their profit margins to the same extent as partner countries.
This favourable assessment does not hold entirely if manufacturing industry is looked at
alone. Although the underlying data is somewhat less reliable, it seems clear that in
manufacturing the improvement in profitability is much less evident. Although in
Denmark, France, and the Netherlands profitability improved markedly since the mid
1980s, some other countries have experienced quite a significant deterioration e.
Belgium, West Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. In Spain, Italy, and the United
Kingdom output prices were squeezed by competition in tradeables up to 1992.Thereafter, devaluation together with no significant acceleration in domestic labour costs
has helped to restore profitability in industry in these countries.
Table 11: Real. unit labour costs performance of Member States
Manufacturing industry
Real unit labour costs; manufacturing industry (b)
Index: 1987=100
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
109. 99.3 92.4 100. 103. 103.
104. 95. 85. 85. 84. 82.
WD (a) 103. 100. 100. 103. 107. 110.
D(a)
112. 96. 106. 109. 114. 110.4
108. 106.5 91.4 94.1 94. 96.
141.8 111.8 98. 98.
104. 103.1 102. 107. 109. 106.4
116. 90. 89. 92. 89. 90.
116. 101.4 88. 91.0 93.4 94.
115. 100. 93. 93. 99. 100.
113. 103. 106. 114. 110. 110.
EUR- (a)
EUR+ (a)
Source: Commission services economicforecast ?4utumn  1993)
(a) WD  West Germany,  D =  Unified Germany
EUR-  EUR12 incl. West Germany, EUR+  EUR12 incl. Unified Germany
(b) 1992-93:eatimatesforB, DK. WD, F, /,
199/-93:  eatimateaforP, UK
BOX 3: Global assessment of capital profitability.
1. Measuring macroeconomic profitability.
From a macroeconomic point of view, the profitability of fixed capital is equal to the
profit rate per unit ofGDP (the unit profit rate) times the average productivity of capital
(the inverse of the capital-output ratio). The unit profit rate is measured by the ratio of
the net operating surplus to the value added at factor cost for the whole economy (or its
manufacturing sector). Since the net operating surplus is defined as net domestic product
(or value added) at factor cost minus the total wage cost of employees, the unit profit
rate - the profit share - is thus the counterpart of the share of labour in value-added
which is also referred to by the term real unit labour cost.(Box 3 cont.)
The average (apparent) productivity or capital is the ratio of the value-added to the net
stock of capital, but the decomposition can be pushed further by breaking down this ratio
into the product of the average (apparent) productivity of labour times the inverse of
capital intensity.
(1) Profitability == Net operating surplus! Capital stock
= Net operating surplus! Value-added x Value-added! Capital stock
(2) Productivity of capital = Value-added! Capital stock
= Value-added! employment x Employment/Capital stock
All these constituent elements are published in the national accounts statistics except for
the capital stock which can be however approximated with these statistics by cumulating
the difference between gross investment flows and depreciation flows. (For more details
on the methodological aspects, see European Economy No 50, Study No 2, December
1991).
2. Interpreting profitability and its main components.
Wage moderation, i.e. a rate of growth of real wage compensation lower than the rate of
growth of labour productivity, means a decrease in real unit labour costs, or an
improvement in the profit share. While the profit share in value-added (or its counterpart,
the labour share) appears to be the main determinant of profitability, and is often used as
its crude proxy, it is clear from the definition and formulas given above that the capital
output ratio also plays an important role in the variation of capital profitability: any
increase in the capital output ratio, i.e. any decrease of the apparent capital productivity,
does affect negatively the profitability of capital. Thus to take but a small sample of
stylized cases, profitability wont improve
a) if the increase in the profit share due to wage moderation goes together with a
similar increase in the capital output-ratio (a fall in capital productivity); such an
increase in the capital-output ratio could result from .a fall in labour productivity or
an increase in the capital intensity of the production process;
b) if, profit shares being stable, an increase in labour productivity comes only via an
increase in capital intensity;
For example, as chart A shows, during the 1980s, the profit shares improved significantly
in the Community, mainly due to wage moderation, making up for the losses registered
in the second half of the seventies, and even exceeding the average level of 1961-1973.
However, a significant part of this improvement in the profit share - shown by the gap
registered between developments in the unit profit rate and the profitability rate - has
been offset by the decline in apparent capital productivity which occurred from 1970 to(Bc)x 3 cont.)
1984: only from 1985 to 1989 did capital productivity recover with the switch to a more
labour-intensive production process (see chart B), but at a rather low rate as labour
productivity growth was affected downwards by the reduction in capital intensity. As 
consequence, the profitability of fixed capital for the Community remains significantly
lower in comparison with its level of the "golden sixties , even for the peak reached in
1989.
Graph A: Profitability of capital stock
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120
80 .......................................
,-............."""'"...................................... ,.......
-~.. Net profit rate
...... Profitabilty of capital stock
Capital productivity
............ ............................,............... ..............,....................."""",,""""""""""'-""""""" """"'--"""""""-""""'-. "........
100
Source: Commission services
Graph B: Capital productivity
Five year moving average of annual percentage rate of growth
_..." Labour productivity
...... Capital intensity (a)
.......-.-.-.--.....".......... ...... ............ ......
capital""prbdilCtiV liY 4 ...............-................
-.-.....-.-..........................-....................... ,........-..'" ... ...\"" , ~ ~ \
2 """"""""""""""""'
"""""""""""'-"""""""""""""'"....... ,......"... """"""""""""""""""""""""""""" ':;::':'~====:'
;::;;;7
00 ~ M ~ ~ m  u ~ n 00 ~ M $ ~ 00 
(8) CapitallntenSltv = KJL
Source: Commission services2 Structural reform: progress at Member State level
As part n of this report shows, progress has been achieved towards tackling structural
obstacles to increased growth in output and employment at the Community level, notably
through the internal market programme. This should, however, be accompanied by
further progress at the level of individual Member States. There is already an increased
recognition by Member States that structural rigidities affecting their national economies
must be tackled. This is a welcome contrast with the past when they were ftequendy
postponed, as the short-term costs outweighed the much greater long-term gains; in
some cases e.g. Spain, structural reform is an important element of the convergence
programmes. These structural reforms are geared to improve the functionnmg of markets
and cover a wide spectrum of domains.
Reforms to improve the adaptability of labour markets and wage moderation
Measures are being pursued to increase work incentives in order to improve labour
supply often through reform of social security systems. These measures include more
stringent eligibility requirements for payment of pensions (increase in retirement age
and/or qualifying period in France, Portugal, and Italy), reduced access to invalidity
pensions (Netherlands) and.a much closer integration of the taxation and welfare systems
(Ireland and Denmark); unemployment benefit systems have been reformed (Denmark)
and/or stricter rules governing payment of unemployment benefits have been enforced
(Belgium and Spain). A much increased emphasis on improved training opportunities
particularly for the long-term unemployed, is evident in virtuaUyaU Member States.
Similarly, measures have or are being taken throughout the Community to improve the
demand for labour such as greater access of employers and workers to part-time
working, temporary contracts, job sharing, temporary leave for family/study purposes
legalisation of private employment agencies etc. The United Kingdom, in particular
undertook a major reform of the labour market in the 1980s. The high level of social
security contributions in Member States is also considered to be depressing the demand
for labour. This has led to the reduction of such charges for employers in certain.
categories in Belgium (with the consequential loss in revenues being funded through
increased energy taxes), France and Spain.
In addition to these reforms, which will bear its fruits mainly in the medium to long tenn,
Member States have more recently adressed the issue of wage moderation. Wage
developments have been slow to respond to the economic downturn and the sharp rise in
unemployment, thus dampening the prospects for recovery. Member States have
accordingly, taken several measures to promote improved wage moderation. This
strategy, recommended by the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992, has led
to a sharp reduction in public sector wage growth. This in turn is helping to reduce wage
pressures generally. In most Member States (e.g. Italy, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain,
Portugal, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark), the rise in public sector wages in 1994 is
currently projected to again remain at or below the rate of inflation. This improved public
sector wage moderation is also sharply reducing the rate of growth of public
consumption, thus facilitating the consolidation of budget deficits.Labour market issues, from structural reform to wage moderation, have in some Member
States been part of social pacts or agreements. This strategy has been particularly
successful in Italy, where the abolition of the indexation of wages ("scala mobile ) in
1992 has been followed in July 1993 by agreement that future wage developments must
be consistent with agreed inflation targets. Similarly, in Germany, the social partners
have agreed to an extended timetable for the equallsation of wages between the Eastern
and Western Lander in key industrial sectors. Spain, Ireland and Portugal are all
currently negotiating social pacts where the needs of employment, wage moderation and
the consolidation of the public finances figure very prominently.
Increased competition
The implementation of the Single Market is the major initiative in the Community's
history aimed at increasing competition. However, apart from the transposition of the
required Community legislation into national legislation, Member States have also taken
domestic initiatives to promote competition. These range from the privatisation
programmes being followed in several Member States (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal), the abolition of state monopolies (Spain), the reduction or re-orientation of
subsidies (Germany and Ireland) and lifting administrative and legal barriers to market
entry (Greece). In many cases these measures have the additional benefit of improving
the public finances of the countries concerned.
Fiscal consolidation and improving the structure of public expenditure and tax
systems
Medium term strategies for fiscal consolidation constitute one of the main elements of
the convergence programmes, as said above. Besides the positive effects stemming from
the reduction of budget deficits Member States have also attached importance to
improving the structure of public expenditure and tax systems. In particular, a growth
oriented pattern of public expenditure is being pursued since recession started to emerge.
Member States have attached priority to public investment in their spending plans in
order to avoid a repetition of the experience of previous recessions when it was the first
casualty of expenditure cutbacks. This strategy is meeting with a positive response and
public investment in the Community has continued to escape the brunt of spending cuts.
This in turn is offsetting the impact of the very sharp fall-off in private investment on .
total investment growth. The available budgetary plans for Member States for 1994 point
to a broad continuation of this strategy and to greater emphasis on restraint in current
expenditure. Several countries have also been pursuing tax reforms (e.g. Denmark and
Greece) intended to simplify their tax systems, to reduce distortions and disincentives
and/or to improve the efficiency of tax collection.
Besides the priority to public instrument, measures to improve business investment
feature strongly in all Member States strategies, particularly in relation to small and
medium sized enterprises. These are largely concentrated on tax incentives or tax
reductions for enterprises, loan subsidies for start-up businesses or measures to boost
private housing demand and hence the construction industry. The newly created funds inPortugal which are providing risk capital to firms are such an example. In the
Netherlands, the new "industrial facility" is a similar initiative. In France, a major portion
of the proceeds of the IIBalladur bond" is being used to ease the cash-flow problems of
SMEs arising &om VAT paymentS. In addition, there is an increased emphasis
throughout the Community on reducing or simplifying regulations and planning
procedures affecting private investment.
Central bank independence
The Treaty on European Union distinguishes three phases in the process towards full
independence of national central banks. In a first step, the ban on central bank financing
of the public sector, which is an important element of central bank independence, will
apply &om 1 January 1994. To comply with this provision, Member States have to adopt
the necessary measures already  ahead of  the start of stage n. Secondly, during stage n
of EMU, Member States shalt, as appropriate, start the process leading to the
independence of central banks. Finally, at the latest at the date of the establishment of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), national legislation including the statutes of
its national central bank will have to be compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the
ESCB.
A number of Member States have recently taken measures to render their central banks
more independent. Belgium, Italy and Portugal have adapted their central bank laws
primarily focussing on the prohibition of central bank financing of the public sector.
France and Spain are in the process of major reforms of their central bank acts. In other
countries internal discussions on the issue have started within the government/central
bank. The main driving force behind these moves has been the greater credibility of the
stability orientation and consequently the lowering of the interest rate risk premium in
these countries.
The changes undertaken so far are encouraging in several respects. Firstly, the
convergence in the institutional framework for economic and monetary policy mirrors a
growing consensus on the role of monetary policy, paving the way for the closer
coordination of national policies during Stage Two. Secondly, the fact that Member
States adopt measures far ahead of the timetable required by the Treaty shows that
Member States are not following a "minimalist approach" in the compliance with Treaty
provisions. Although not at all required at this stage and despite the difficulties involved
in designing at the present time a central bank law both suitable for the different
institutional setups of Stages Two and Three, the changes in many respects already
establish a high degree of compatibility with the Treaty.
The Belgian central bank law was amended in March 1993. In line with Art 104 of the
Treaty, it completely abolishes central bank financing of the government; furthermore
the new act abolishes the censeur's veto right in the field of monetary policy, foreign
exchange operations, the holding and management of official reserves and the promotion
of the smooth operation of the payment systems, i.e. in the areas constituting the future
tasks ofthe ESCB.In Greece, according to a bill adopted in 1992, central bank financing of the government
through its overdraft facility was halved; this overdraft facility is going to be abolished on
l1anuary 1994.
In Spain, the government submitted a draft law to Parliament at the end of 1992.
Following the June 1993 general election, anew draft has been submitted according to
constitutional rules, and the law is envisaged to enter into force on 1. 1994. The draft
law ensures full autonomy to the Banco de Espana and grants it sole responsibility for
monetary policy.
In France, a new central bank law passed Parliament in July 1991; part of it was
declared anti-constitutional by the Constitutional Council in August. The law was
published as amended by the Constitutional Council. The Treaty having entered into
force, the French government intends to submit the remaining parts of the law to
Parliament. The law notably abolishes any central bank financing of the public sector; the
Governor is appointed for a fixed term of six years.
In Italy, the central bank was granted sole responsibility for discount rate changes in
February 1992 (Law no. 82 of? Feb 1992). In November 1993, Parliament passed a law
abolishing any form of credit line of the government with the central bank.
In Luxembourg, the government is currently (mid-November 1993) in the process of
putting before Parliament a major reform of the law relating to the Institut mon6ta1re
Luxembourgois. The draft would incorporate the Treaty provisions on central bank
independence including central bank financing.
In Portugal a major reform of the Central Bank law took place in October 1990. The
Bank of Portugal was granted formally the sole responsibility for the implementation of
monetary and exchange rate policy. Credit to the government was formally forbidden,
although some exceptions still persist, e.g. primary market purchases of government
bonds are still possible, although under very restrictive conditions. The credit line for the
Government was abolished at the end of 1992.
Apart from these initiatives, all Member States are currently in the process of adjusting
national practices and legislation to the requirements of the prohibition of central bank
financing of the public sector and to the prohibition of privileged access of the public
sector to financial institutions.PART TWO
Assessment of the implementation of Community law regarding the
internal market
INTRODUcnON
The 1st January 1993 marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of the
Internal Market. The objective set out in Article 8A of the Treaty, as amended by the
Single European Act, has largely been achieved, except for the removal of identity
controls on persons at all the internal borders. By the deadline 95% of the basic
legislative programme foreseen in the Commissions 1985 White Paper had been adopted
by the Council. In certain sectors, not covered by the 1985 White Paper programme,
notably energy and telecommunications services, considerable work has still to be
undertaken to create a Single Market.
Firms can now operate in an environment that allows them to trade in products and
services and fosters closer integration of co-operation and hence of the industrial fabric.
This has been achieved through progress in the following fields:
Harmonisation of technical rules as provided for in the White Paper has now been
completed; initially confined to specific limited areas, it was extented to cover
entire sectors such as agriculture and food products, pharmaceutical products and
motor vehicles. Harmonisation of essential product safety requirements, backed up
by a policy of certification, and the general provisions on product safety and
liability for defective products mean that all manufactured products marketed in the
Community are now covered.
The measures have been adopted to permit public contracts to open to competition
from firms in other Member States, irrespective of whether such contracts are
awarded by public authorities or public services and are intended for the purchase
of supplies, the purchase of services or the carrying-out of work. The relevant
directives include provisions on appeal procedures allowing national courts to
review matters.
Freedom to provide services will soon become a reality, where this is not the case
already, with the gradual entry into force of the directives and regulations adopted
on transport, financial services, telecommunications, recognition of diplomas, and
the equivalence of professional qualifications. A final decision paving the way for
the liberalisation of road cabotage was adopted in October.
Since it is not enough simply to provide for freedom of movement and since firms
must also be in a position to derive full benefit from it through corporate
restructuring and the restructuring of their business strategies, the proposals on
company law, company taxation, and industrial and intellectual property formed anintegral part of the programme. The relevant objectives have been only partially
achieved since, although most of the harmonisation measures relating to industrial
and intellectual property have been adopted and although certain forms of double
taxation have been eliminated, the key proposals are still before the Council
, i.
those relating to the EuropetUl company statute, the establishment of a trade marks
office and the complete elimination of taxation at source on interest and royalty
payments and taking into account oflosses suffered abroad.
Such measures relating to the opening-up of markets to flows of products services
and capital from other Member States have been made irreversible by the
elimination of all administrative checks at intra-Community frontiers. The abolition
on 1 January 1993 of the single administrative document in intra-Community trade
and the entry into force of a series of provisions reorganising tax, veterinary, plant-
health, health, safety and statistical controls have made it possible to do away with
checks at frontiers.
Freedom of movement for individuals properly speaking .has not yet become a
reality. Individuals also benefit from the dismantling of customs and tax controls at
internal frontiers, and Community nationals may now work in any other Member
State thanks to recognition of their diplomas and qualifications and may reside in
any other Member State regardless of any economic activity. Despite this, checks
on persons are still carried out at internal borders although these have already been
lightened. As underlined at the recent Schengen ministerial meeting on the 18th 
October 1993, these controls shall be abolished by 1st of February 1994.
FuNCTIONING OF THE SINGLE MARKET
Implementation and Transposition of Community Legislation
Of the 282 White Paper measures, 264 have been adopted by the Council (95%). The
transposition in the national legislations is proceeding: 261 White Paper measures have
entered into force (90%), of which 219 require national transposition measures. 85% of
the total number of necessary transposition measures have been taken. 110- of the 218
measures have been transposed in all 12 member states, 28 in 11 member states, 21 in 10
member states, 62 in 9 or fewer (of which 21 in 5 or fewer) member states.
An analysis by member state shows that Denmark has taken 94% of the necessary
transposition measures, followed by UK (90%), Italy and Belgium (89%). Most delays in
transposition are in Ireland (80%), Germany (78%) and Greece (75%). When broken
down by sector, it emerges that transposition has been completed or is above average in
the areas of freedom of movement of capital, in elimination of physical frontiers (various
controls and controls on persons), in financial services (excluding insurance), in
elimination oftechnical barriers, company taxation, VAT and excise duties.
When analysing the rate of transposition it is important to bear in mind the fact that
certain items of legislation will only enter into force in 1994 and 1995. This fact caninfluence the speed with which measures are transposed, to the extent that Member
States accord lower priority to those measures which are scheduled to come into effect
at a later date. Nevertheless, the Commission remains concerned with the extent 
delays in the following areas:
company law: With the exception of the European Economic Interest Grouping
just 60% of the necesary national transposition measures concerning the 5
Community legislative acts have been taken.
intellectual and .industrial property: the delays in transposition are concentrated On
the directives on legal protection of registered marks and on protection of
computer programmmes which only entered into force since the beginning of the
year. Further difficulties in transposition are caused by the complex and technical
nature of legislation in this field. The level of transposition comes to 61%. 
addition, the Convention on the Community Patent has not yet been ratified by all
member states to enable its entry into force.
public procurement: only 62% of the necessary transposition measures have been
taken. In respect of two directives in the excluded sectors, relating to works and
supplies, and legal remedies, transposition measures have been taken in 6 and 3
member states respectively. In addition, the directive on services which entered
into force on 1 st July 1993 has been transposed so far in only 3 member states.
financial services: while the transposition of measures in the banking and
investment services sectors is above average (90% and 87% respectively), the level
of transposition in the insurance sector is 73%, where there are important delays in
transposition by Greece, Spain and Luxembourg.
tree movement of labour and professions: 75% of the necessary transposition
measures have been taken. The first general directive on the mutual recognition of
professional qualifications has been transposed correctly in 8 member states. With
regard to the directives on right of residence, important delays in transposition
persist, in particular, in France and Germany.
It is still too early to draw general conclusions about the practical operation of the single
market mainly because, taking account of the periods for transposition, economic
operators and citizens have not had the time to take advantage or experience the effects
of the new rules. The Commission has, however, received only a limited number of
complaints concerning possible deficiencies in the legislation. Although some measures
to accompany the abolition of border controls on goods have not yet entered into force
(transfer of wastes, repatriation of cultural goods, sales of explosives etc), any difficulties
experienced in the interim are being dealt with through closer administrative cooperation
between the authorities of the member states and with the Commission.
Apart trom inevitable teething problems which have either already been resolved or are in
the process of resolution, the "transitional" VAT system has performed well and has
facilitated the tTee circulation of products. Nevertheless, economic operators have drawnattention to difficulties relating to specific provisions of the specialised regimes. This has
been the case ,notably, with respect to the requirement for firms with .a level of turnover
in another Member State in excess of a certain threshold to appoint  fiscal
representative. These difficulties have been examined by the  Comite d'Ecoute des
entreprises established by the Commission. In a number of cases, these problems have
already been effectively tackled. On the whole, the experience with the operation of the
transitional" VAT system has been largely positive. The Commission will make further
proposals for appropriate simplification as required. Moreover a full report will be
prepared by the Commission on the working of the transitional VAT regime which will
be presented to the Council at the end of 1994 together with proposals for the adoption
of a definitive VAT regime, which will allow a further reduction in the administrative
burden on businesses in the Community.
Making the Single Market work
The work of building the Single Market did not end with the opening of the internal
ftontiers on 1st January 1993. The Commission is determined to ensure and reinforce
progressively the effectiveness of the Single Market. This task is the subject of the
preparation of a strategic programme by the Commission, based on its working
document (COM(93)256) ofJune 2nd 1993). It takes into account proposed actions set
out in its Communication of 2nd December 1992 (SEC(92)2277) in reponse to the
Sutherland Report "the Internal Market after 1992: Meeting the Challenge
The proper functioning of the Single Market is the basis for the improvement of living
conditions of the Community's citizens. The objectives outlined in the strategic
programme are clearly approached from this perspective. These objectives are:
to respond to the expectations of citizens
to ensure a competitive environment for enterprise and to ensure that consumers
and enterprises will be able to take an active pact in the functioning of the internal
market and take advantage of the possiblities thatthe internal market offers them
to ensure in the. Single Market the impetus for economic and social development.
To fulfil these objectives precise lines of action for an effective application of the
regulations and a dynamic development of the internal market are presented in the
working document attached to the above-mentioned communication.
For an effective application:
The instruments of control with respect to Community obligations as laid down in
the Treaty of Rome will be fully exploited to prevent new obstacles to trade. The
extension to the services sector of the notification mechanism for new technical
rules in the field of goods is under consideration.The effective application of the Single Market regulations in all member states
requires the full transposition of Community legislation, the monitoring of the
conformity of national transposition measures and the monitoring of the
convergent implementation of these rules in all member states, based on clear
interpretations to be provided by the Commission. A satisfactory framework for
control has to be set up to assure the member states that surveillance of the
functioning of the regulations is being carried out. An improved access to justice
and judicial. cooperation will create real confidence in the Single Market whilst
individuals and enterprises should be aware of proper and effective means of
redress in case of violations of their rights. Consideration should be given to the
promotion of training of lawyers in Communty law, to better transparency of
possible sanctions and to effective enforcement of judgements between member
states (the Brussels convention).
Initiatives for the organisation of partnership with the member states are envisaged
in the fields of administrative cooperation between the member states and between
the member states and the Commission, in order to ensure the effective application
of Community law and to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence.
This includes
improvement .of early warning systems for dangerous goods, the introduction of
early warning systems in the services sector, improvement of the administrative
infrastructure, training for officials, exchange programmes - some are already in
operation - and setting up data transmission networks between administrations.
The transparency of Community actions also requires formal and informal
consolidation of Community legislation. A communication on consolidation
requirements in the Internal Market field will be published shortly. Furthermore
the Commission intends to improve information on and circulation of information
in the Single Market, also by using already existing networks as the Euro Info
Centres.
For II dynamic development
The dynamic development of the Internal Market has to be placed in the context of many
Community activities, in particular the initiatives for the promotion of economic growth,
competitiveness and employment. It should be also borne in mind that the further
development of the Internal Market has to be accomplished by strengthening social and
economic cohesion, social policy, environment and research policy, as well as actions to
ensure that the interests and rights of consumers are fully taken into account as the
internal market evolves. These objectives are also in compliance with the results 
of the
European Council at Copenhagen.
The current discussion of the Strategic Programme .and the White Paper on
competitivity, growth and employment are closely linked. The White Paper will outline
future policy on the Internal Market and refer to the Strategic Programme which will set
out the actions to be carried out. At the European Council on 10th December 1993 the
broad policy outline, contained in the White Paper, will be discussed. The formalpresentation of the Strategic Programme will take place at the meeting of the Internal
Market Council on 16th December 1993.
Additionally the dynamic development of the Internal Market relies also on the pursuit of
many current actions. Measures are under way, for example, in the fields of intellectual
property and of protection of personal data, on standardisation policy. In particular, in
recognition of the importance of SMEs potential for growth and employment creation,
the Council has adopted a multi-annual programme to assist SMEs to rise to the
challenges and opportunities inherent in the internal market. On the occasion of the first
SME Council on November 11 1993, it issued a Resolution calling for a second
generation of Community actions to cater for the needs and interests ofSMEs.
O1mmunity policies which interact with the Internal Market:
New initiatives are envisaged by the Commission as a means of ensuring that the full
economic and industrial benefits of the Single Market are realised. These measures are in
particular intended to:
III improve the tax environment for enterprises so as to eliminate obstacles to
cooperation and cross-border activities:
III promote quality in European industry:
III develop an integrated approach to trans-European networks in the fields of energy,
transport, telecommunications and telematics networks:
III special actions to assist SMEs to take full advantage of the benefits of a single
market.
In addition, the Commission is examining ways in which the interrelationships between
other Community policies and the Internal Market can be developed and improved with a
view to ensuring the proper functioning of the Internal Market, and the effective
realisation of other Community objectives. In particular:
vigilant application of competition policy safeguards must prevent the
liberalisation generated by the Internal Market programme from being undermined .
by anticompetitive practices on the part of economic op.erators or governments:
the effective management of the Community's external frontiers and a dynamic
commercial policy are essential if individuals and firms are to feel confident and
secure in the absence of internal frontiers and if the growth of illiberal and
protectionist reactions is to be avoided:
environment policy and the Internal Market must be coordinated so that the
. objectives of sustainable economic development and of guaranteeing the "four
freedoms" are met and so that potential conflicts are resolved on the basis of a
coherent approach.After having undertaken wide consultations with all concerned parties the Commission
intends to adopt the definitive version of the strategic programme and to present it to the
Council and Parliament before the end of 1993.
ELEMENTS FOR A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF TIlE INTERNAL MARKET PROGRAMME
Introduction
The Community has scored an outstanding success in constructing the legislative
framework necessary for the functioning of the internal market. During the course of this
process, the Member States have demonstrated a commitment to the objective of a single
market which has firmly established the credibility of this framework in the eyes of
economic operators throughout the Community. The conviction that an Internal Market
was in the making, and that it would herald significant new commercial opportunities
has prompted enterprises in many sectors to implement new investment and sales
strategies. The pages which follow document actions undertaken by Community and
third country enterprises to gear up in anticipation of the single market. Nevertheless
these anticipation effects represent only the first chapter in the Internal Market story. The
full range of economic benefits will only be realised once the new legislative framework
is firmly embedded, and once economic operators have had sufficient time to take full
advantage of efficiency improvements and new commercial openings.
The current recession, which cannot be attributed to the restructuring contingent on
internal market completion, has nevertheless obscured the benefits which were expected
to flow from this process. In this respect, it is important to emphasise that progress
towards the realisation of an Internal Market will strengthen the underlying competitive
strengths of the industrial and services sectors concerned, and thereby provide the best
guarantee for sustainable recovery once macroeconomic conditions improve.
Furthermore, the Internal Market has acted as a brake on any temptation on the part of
Member States to renationalise certain elements of economic, monetary or commercial
policy. Any misguided return to "go-it -alone policies would have proved
counterproductive for economic operators and the Member States concerned.
The following paragraphs try to bring together some preliminary indicators which
suggest that, even at this early stage in the process, the enabling legislation of the
Internal Market programme is beginning to makes its influence felt in certain sectors of
the EC economy. For a number of reasons, it is too early to attempt a global assessment
of the economic impact of the Internal Market.
Firstly, much Internal Market legislation is only beginning to make its effects felt.
Indeed, in many areas (e. , insurance, public procurement) important elements of
the legislative ftamework will only enter into force over the coming months.Appropriate complementary measures, such as Trans-European NetworkS and
actions to help SMEs, must be put in place if the full potential of the internal
market is to be realised.
Economic operators have to become accustomed to the new ftamework, and to
adapt their activities accordingly.
A fundamental precondition for a wholehearted private-sector response to the Internal
Market programme is that the legislative ftamework be seen to work, and enjoy full
credibility in the eyes of economic operators. The forthcoming Strategic Programme on
the functioning of the Internal Market is intended to ensure that the effectiveness of this
legislative ftamework be sustained and further developed by tackling the issues raised
above. In particular, the Strategic Programme aims to improve the Community capacity
to ensure implementation .and enforcement, to develop appropriate flanking measures,
and to deepen private sector understanding and familiarity with the Internal Market
ftamework.
It would be premature to attempt a full-scale economic analysis of the impact of the
Internal Market programme at this stage. Nevertheless, the following text tries to bring
together some early indications that the Internal Market programme has stimulated
certain economic processes which, over the longer-tenn, will contribute to 
strengthening of economic performance in the Community. Much 
of the evidence is
related to the anticipatory response of the private sector to the Internal Market
programme, for example cross-border investment activity. Information on the ex-post
benefits which flow ftom the removal of internal border controls, the elimination of
technical barriers, and other elements of the Internal Market programme which took
effect on January 1, 1993, remains scanty and largely anecdotal for the time being. In
addition, it is extremely difficult to extricate the effects of the Internal Market
programme ftom other forces which are operating simultaneously on the EC economy.
These issues will be tackled in greater detail and on the basis of a fully worked out
methodology in the wide-ranging study of the impact of the Internal Market which the
Commission is preparing for 1996. This analysis will not focus only on the business
dynamics linked to the realisation of the Internal Market , but it will also take into
account the effect of Internal Market completion on other Community objectives
, such as
the achievement of sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment,
and the contribution to regional cohesion.
The Internal Market Programme is best understood as a supply-side initiative, designed
to improve the structural soundness of the EC economies and to enhance the
attractiveness of the EC as a base for industrial and service activities. This objective is to
be achieved through the removal of legal and administrative obstacles which have
traditionally denied many EC firms the possibility of corporate development through
expansion on to partner country markets. The primary effects of Internal Market
completion will manifest themselves in the form of new commercial opportunities for
Parameters as laid down in Council Resolution of December 7, 1992. OJ C 334, 18.12.92.individual companies, operating in sectors where hidden trade barriers were most
prevalent. It is the capacity of individual companies to perceive new openings which have
been created by the Internal Market, and their ability to capitalise on them which will
drive forward the process of market integration .and unleash the wider economic benefits
described in the Cecchini report. In this respect, the Internal Market programme can be
seen as a facilitator - it creates a ftamework conducive to corporate development, but it
requires an appropriate response ftom industry and services before the promise of the
Internal Market can be transformed into an improved business and economic
performance.
The effects of the Internal Market programme will unfold over a number of stages.
III Initially, the Internal Market programme leads to a reduction 
in trade costs, and
opens up access to previously sheltered sectors of the Member State markets. In
turn, this should lead to the establishment of a number of new markets based 
geographic proximity, similar cultural traditions and economic structures. Firms
can then develop new or improved products to better serve these new markets.
III One striking feature of the Internal Market process bas been tbe way in 
which
many companies have tried to anticipate the effects of Internal Market completion
by adapting their operations proactively. The effects of these strategic responses on
market structures will be a major determinant of the influence of the Internal
Market on intra-EC trade and investment.
By facilitating increased economic interpenetration, the Internal Market should
then increase competitive discipline in those sectors characterised by a high
incidence of non-tariff borriers. Given the changing complexion of competition and
trade, many companies will react by revising or overhauling their activities and
strategies.
III Ultimately, the reshuftling of market structures and business strategies may be
reflected in a strengthening of the competitive position of individual companies or
sectors.
At this early stage of the process, the immediate cost savings linked to barrier removal
are becoming apparent. In addition, there is evidence that some companies are actively
gearing up in preparation for the emerging single market. Finally, those sectors where
Internal Market legislation has been in place for some time (e.
, some elements of
technical legislation) are witnessing an evolution of intra-EC trade and a strengthening in
cross-border competition which may be traced back to the 
completion of the single
market.
Reduction in trade costs and removal of access barriers
The most visible result of the Internal Market Programme to date has been the
dismantling of administrative formalities on cross-border shipment of goods. A recentsurvey of 156 Euro-Info Centres confirms that the abolition of frontier controls on
vehicles and cross-border shipments of goods has signficantly increased the facility with
which companies can bring their product to markets in other BC countries.2) This
development has reduced the need for many smaller companies to rely on the services 
export agents when selling their products in other EC Member States. In addition, the
abolition of border controls has speeded up delivery times for products, with a
consequent reduction in transport costs. Estimates, provided by companies which engage
in cross-border shipments, of the savings resulting ftom the removal of border delays are
of the order of 3-4% of expenditure on international road transport. The savings will be
significantly higher for short distance shipments across ftontiers.
The removal of technical trade barriers is widely seen as one of the most significant
benefits to be derived from the Internal Market programme.3) However, it is impossible
to provide an overall estimate of the savings that will result ftom the eradication of
needless technical adaptation and duplication of conformity assessment costs. The
savings which will flow ftom the emergence of common EC technical specifications and
testing procedures will vary ftom product to product, as a function of the technical
discrepancies which previously existed, and the cost structures of the products
concerned. However, it can confidently be asserted that the potential savings will be
sizeable for many sectors. In addition, by cutting out the need for product redesign and
adaptation to match separate national requirements products can be brought to the
market more quickly. These time savings could represent a significant benefit for
products where product development costs are high, and product life-cycles are short.
However, it may take some time before common technical specifications come into
widespread use, and before test results, certification procedures, and conformity marks
provided in one Member State are accepted without reservation in another. The EIC
survey underlined continued scope for improvement with respect to mutual recognition
of national tests and certificates, and of CE-marked goods coming ftom other Member
States.
EC public procurement legislation heralds a potentially dramatic shake-up of markets
which have long been shielded from competitive pressures. However, this legislation has
only recently come into effect for supplies, works (January 1993) and services (July
1993), and has yet to enter into force as far as public utilities are concerned (July 1994).
It will take some time before the effects of this legislation on cross-border public
procurement can be properly .assessed. This point is clearly underscored in the EIC
survey which notes that SMEs continue to encounter administrative obstacles, unrealistic
deadlines, and difficulties in obtaining contracts and supporting documentation.
Controls on capital movements have, in the past, served to hamper cross-border
investment in physical and financial assets, thereby denying investors opportunities to
earn the highest return on their funds or preventing them from constructing preferred
portfolios. Capital controls also constituted one of the most formidable obstacles to the
EC Commission, Projet Euro-Info Centre (1993): EIC - Single Market Questionnaire: Results.
EUROPEAN Observatory for SMEs (1993): First Annual Report.
For instance, it has been estimated that a reduction in one month in the time needed to bring a new
automobile model to market could generate gains of30 million Ecus for the manufacturer.cross-border provision of financial services, as financial institutions could not transfer
liquidity ftom one area of operations to another at short notice. Since the 
abolition of
ftontier controls, capital market integration has been significantly intensified. Graphs 8 &
9 illustrate the increase in flows of portfolio investment between individual Member
States and other countries. These charts illustrate a sharp increase in portfolio investment
into and out of all Member States examined. Taken together
, this evidence suggests that
the Internal Market programme has been aCcompanied by, and has contributed to, a
qualitative increase in the degree ofEC capital market integration.
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Graph 9: portfono Investment In other EC countries
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10  EUROSTATAnticipation effects - Foreign Direct Invemtment
Many companies have moved quickly to gear up for the new opportunities and
challenges implicit in the Internal Market. In particular, the completi.on of the Internal
Market is making it progressively more profitable for companies to serve partner country
markets, and is making it increasingly worthwhile for firms to organise their activities on
an EC-wide basis, Companies are therefore looking further afield when taking locational
and investment decisions. Foreign Direct Investment (I'D!) can act as one 
vehicle for
company expansion on partner country markets. FDI can take the form of a cross-border
transfer of capital through which an investing enterprise creates a new f.oreign company,
gains control (fully or partly) of an already existing entreprise
, or develops the business
of an already .affiliated foreign company. FDItherefore involves managerial say over
productive activities in another country.
S) The completion of the Internal Market
encaurages companies in one Member State to invest in partner countries in order 
take advantage of location-specific advantages, to internalise assets of an acquired
company, or to gain a foothold on the partner country market. Foreign direct investment
has increased in tandem with the programme for the completion .of the Internal Market.
This trend has been common to all EC Member States.
This FDI was oriented heavily towards those sectors most directly concerned by the
Internal Market legislation. The services sectors, in particular, were characterised by a
sweeping restructuring of their international .operations, In absolute terms
, there has been
a marked increase in FDI in the finance and banking sectors. However, FDI has been
even higher in other service sectors when expressed as a proportion of value added in
that sector, The relative importance .of FDI in services vis- vis industrial products can
be explained by the need for service providers to be close to their customers, and by the
fact that the Internal Market has had a relatively more pronounced liberalising effect in
these industries,
It is also interesting to note that non-EC companies have stepped up their investment in
the EC. In large part, this development attests to an established worldwide trend towards
globalised production. Nevertheless, the Internal Market Programme - by enhancing the
profitability of investment projects - has encouraged foreign investors to step up foreign
direct investment in the EC. The success of the Internal Market in attracting foreign
investors is confirmed by business surveys and by trade associations in the US and Japan.
(ffiTRO, US ITC). Extra-EC FDI into the EC has also been concentrated in those
industries and services sectors which are most affected by the Internal Market
Programme.
FDI can take a number of specific forms, One subset of intra-EC Foreign Direct
Investment which has received considerable attention in recent years consists .of mergers
acquisitions and ather forms of alliance. In some cases, these alliances have been
conceived of as a defensive step to consolidate positions on national markets before the
The OECDuses a threshold of 10% of the voting power of the affiliated company in order to
duistinguish investment designed to yield significant say in the management of an enterprise from
portfolio investment.arrival of new competitors established in partner countries. However
, the surge in the
number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the latter half of the 1980s testifies to
a growing tendency for many firms to conceive of their operations on a pan-
European
scale. Mergers, acquisitions and alliances are viewed as a means of acquiring an
established foothold in partner country markets, of internalisingassets which enhance the
firms corporate strengths, and of ensuring that its products have access to appropriate
distribution networks.
To exploit the profitable potential of enlarged market opportunities many firms
strategic response has been to expand. Completion of the internal market gives large
industrial and financial groups both the opportunity and the 
incentive to engage in
increased direct investment and foreign acquisitions within the Community in order to
achieve a scale comensurate with the enlarged markets upon which they operate. As
evidence of this, Graph 10 shows that between 1986 and 1992, total transborder
acquisitions (controlling stake obtained) in manufacturing grew from 231 to 666
, with a
peak of 947 in 1990. Meanwhile, total transborder acquisitions in all sectors grew from
436 in 1986 to 1162 in 1992, peaking at 1722 in 1992.
One can also usefully analyse acquisitions within theEC by international enterprises
taking into account their origin - Community, or international non-Community. Before
1986, less than 25% of the total number of trans border operations recorded were carried
out by EC enterprises. Between 1989 and 1992
, however such operations have
continually accounted for over 60% of total acquisitions in all sectors (cf.graph 11). This
provides clear indication as to the extent of the pan-Europeamsation process within EC
firms.
This picture of increasing merger and acquisition activities inside the Community after
the start of the internal market programme is repeated when we look at the development
of both transborder and intra-border acquisitions after 1986. These grew spectacularly
between 1987 and 1989. (table 12). According to management surveys
, these operations
have frequently been due to the implementation of the internal market and to increasing
economic globalisation. All sectors have seen relatively similar increases in the number of
concentrations, although the increase was more rapid in industry where these operations
rose by almost 300% than in services where mergers and acquisitions increased by 200%.
Moreover, the subsequent slight decline in acquisitions between 1989 and 1992 has
affected industry (-15%) less than services (-23%). This slowdown probably reflects both
the worldwide recession and the fact that many of the production rationalisation
possibilities sparked by the internal market programme have now been exploited. Most
M&A activity is between enterprises of the same nationality even though their
importance declined from 85% in 1987 to 66% in 1990. Activity in 
services tends to be
more national in nature in services than in industry. In the same way, Community-
level
activity is higher in services than is true for international-
level activity.Graph 10: Total cross-border acqulsltlons- manufacturing
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1000
400
800
600
200
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Source: AMDATA
Graph 11: Share of total cross-border acquisitions
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Source: AMDATATable 12: Mergers and acquisitions inside the Community market by type of
operation and by sector, 1987-1992
Country National Community International Total
Operations Operations Operations Ouerations
Number I Number I Number I Number I
ustry
1987 878 82. 104 10. 960 100
1988 985 71.0 257 18. 146 10. 1388 100
1989 1766 65. 538 19. 410 15. 2714 100
1990 1648 61.5 574 21.4 457 17. 2679 100
1991 1787 68. 457 17.4 383 14. 2627 100
1992 1573 68. 365 15. 367 15. 2305 100
Ind
Services
1987 923 87. 1058 100
1988 1092 83. 143 10. 1308 100
1989 1717 72.4 402 17. 252 10. 2371 100
1990 1624 69. 433 18. 277 11.9 2334 100
1991 1533 75. 283 14. 208 10. 2024 100
1992 1343 73. 248 13. 227 12. 1818 100
Total
1987 1868 85. 187 8.5 135 2190 100
1988 2382 78. 420 13. 225 3027 100
1989 3811 69. 1021 18.4 689 12. 5541 100
1990 3606 66. 1066 19. 783 14. 5455 100
1991 3631 72. 797 15. 616 12. 5044 100
1992 3247 71.3 651 14.3 655 14.4 4553 100
Source: AMDATA
Mergers and acquisitions .have been used as a vehicle for entry to partner country
markets in sectors such as banking where access to an existing retail network is crucial
for commercial success. Table 13 provides a breakdown of those cross-border mergers
and alliances between financial institutions between 1987-93 which were reported in the
financial press. The pro-competition effect of the Internal Market in financial and banking
services has been mirrored in the insurance sectors. In most EC countries, the market
share of foreign firms in terms of premiums written has been on the increase. By
accentuating competition, domestic incumbent firms will be placed under pressure to
adopt more cost-efficient practices, as well as to speed up the introduction of new
products in response to consumer demands. However, strong defensive behaviour on the
part of national incumbents could also offset the effects of increased foreign presence by
providing domestic firms with a bulwark against increased cross-border competition. The
trend towards smaller numbers of companies on insurance markets is a widely reported
trend. The impact of these developments on the degree of competition will require
detailed and sophisticated observation and analysis within the uamework of existing
cOlnpetences, with a view to assessing the implications for the degree of competition on
relevant markets.Table 13: Cross-border alliances between financial institutions, 1987-
(by country of origin of target and initiating companies).
Target country s country
Initiating Others Total
s country
France
Germany 10 
Spain
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Belgium
Others
Total 247
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin: August  1993.
In addition to cross-border investment and establishment, the Internal Market has elicited
other strategic and organisational responses ITom firms. Individual companies have
abandoned their traditional segmentation of the EC market into separate national
divisions, upgraded product development and introduced quality management systems
and overhauled packaging, marketing and distribution systems. Prior to the Internal
Market programme, firms maintained subsidiaries in various Member States at great
expense, with separate registered offices and increased administrative and tax costs.
Facilitated by more flexible and less costly transportation costs, corporations have tended
to replace multiple regional or national locations by Euro-centralised production and
distribution networks with more destinations. These developments have not yet been
analysed systematically. Nevertheless, they represent a potentially significant category of
reactions to the Internal Market programme.
Changes in intra-EC trade and competition
The success of the Internal Market hinges on the extent to which it succeeds in
stimulating intra-EC trade and thereby providing a shot-in-the-arm to cross-border
competition. Through this mechanism, the Internal Market programme will unleash new
dynamics which may result in a strengthening of the industrial and services tissue of the
EC economy. The Internal Market has to be seen in the context of the increasing
globalisation of the world economy for markets, production and finance. It .should be
seen as contributing to this process, and as a way of preparing Community firms for
international competition. It would be inaccurate to interpret this process as a form of
retrenchment on the Community market. The growth in intra-Community trade
represents, therefore, an indicator of the increasingly international outlook of previously
national-oriented firms, and does not constitute a handicap to, or an alternative for the
participation of Community firms on world markets.Table 14 gives the share of each Member State s total exports and imports which are
accounted for byintra-EC trade over a number of years. For both exports and imports
the period between 1980 and 1990 registered a significant increase in this share for the
nine countries which comprised the EC in 1980, except for Ireland where the share bas
generally been much higher anyway. On average, intra-EC trade was approxi.n1ately 11
points higher for imports in 1990 than in 1980, and nearly 10 points higher for exports.
However, for exports, this development took place between 1985 and 1990 which
suggests that the liberalising effects of Internal Market legislation were beginning to filter
through. For Greece, Spain and Portugal the combined effects of accession and
deepening of economic integration through the Internal Market programme has led to
spectacular increases in the export and import shares of 10-20 percentage points between
1985 and 1990.
Table 14: Share ofIntra-EC Trade in total trade in pereent
Imports and exports by Member States
Country 1980 1985 1990 1992
Import I :Export Import I Export Import I :Export Import I Export
original BIL 61.6 73. 68. 70. 70. 75. 71.2 74.
six 52. 55.4 59. 53. 64. 62. 65. 63.
Member 49.4 51.1 53. 49. 54. 54.3 54. 54.
stat.os 46. 51.6 47. 48. 57. 58. 58. 57.
54. 73. 55. 74. 59. 76. 58. 75.
1st 50. 51.6 50. 44. 53. 52. 55.4 54.5
enlargement IRE 75. 76. 71.7 68. 70. 74. 71.9 74.
40. 45. 47. 48. 51.0 52. 50. 55.5
2nd & 3'" 40. 48. 48. 54. 64. 64. 62. 64.
c:nhugcment 45. 58. 45. 62. 69. 73. 73. 74.
31.3 52. 37. 53. 59. 65. 60. 66.
49. 55. 53. 54. 58. 61.0 59. 61.3
Source: EUROSTAT. Theformersystem a/statistics collection baaed on CIlstoms declarations at intra-Community
frontiers was replaced on January 
I, 1993  by INTRASTAT. For structural refl$On8, INTRASTAT results
for the first quarter of 1993  cannot be compared with statistics collected under theformer system.
All sectors are affected by the opening up of markets due to the 1992 programme, but a
certain number of manufacturing sectors have been more protected by non-tariff barriers
than others due to a differences in standards, irttportance of ftontier formalities, limited
access to public procurement, and differences in VAT and excise regimes. Forty
manufacturing sectors out of the 120 sectors which make up manufacturing industry
were identified as being most sensitive to the removal of non-tariff barriers. For the forty
sectors which are expected to be most .affected and to benefit most ftom internal marketcompletion (high-tech industries, mechanical and electrical engineering and transport
goods industries), exports to the EC market increased enormously between 1979 and
1992 when compared against exports to non-EC countries.
The reciprocal tendency for companies in the various Member States to enter into each
others markets in the quest for new market outlets should lead to keener competition on
national markets in the sectors affeCted by the removal of non-tariff barriers. In
particular, intra-EC trade may be leading to lower levels of concentration in national
markets for products such as medical and surgical equipment, machine tools, electrical
machinery, consumer electronics, and transmission equipment). Imports ftom other
Member States in these sectors now account for an increased share of domestic
consumption, which also amounts to greater competitive pressure on domestic
producers. In order to evaluate the final impact of the Internal Market Programme on
market structures at national level, it would be necessary to take into account a range of
other faCtors, including any defensive reactions by domestic producers to increased
cross-border competition. It will also be necessary to allow .sufficient time for the new
market structures to settle down before making any definitive pronouncements on the
impact of the Internal Market Programme on the degree of competition in previously
sheltered sectors of national markets. These considerations could form a central part of
the 1996 study on the impact of the Internal Market.
In certain services industries, the increased competition induced by Internal Market
liberalisation has had significant effects. One notable example is the case of air passenger
transport. The introduction of fifth fteedom rights (the fteedom to pick up passengers in
one Member State on an outward journey and to carry them to a third country, or to
collect passengers in a third country on the return leg of a homeward journey) and
consecutive cabotage has triggered a round of fare competition on a number of intra-
routes.
Although the internal market bas not yet reached its full potential, its credibility and
irrevocability have exerted profound effects on business behaviour. On average
econometric calculations made by the Commission services show that the contribution 
integration to economic growth,_powered largely by significant anticipation effects, has
accounted for around 0.4% per year during the period 1986-92.
CONCLUSIONS
The basic legislative ftamework underpinning the Internal Market is now almost fully in
place. Over 90% of the White Paper measures are in force and the level of transposition
of adopted directives into the laws of the Member States amounts to over 84%. The
success of the introduction of the legislative programme by 1st January 1993, in
accordance with the timescale laid down in the Single Act, has exceeded most initial
expectations. The Commissions proposal to draw up a strategic programme is intended
to ensure the smooth functioning of the Single Market based on this ftamework. The
Commission has no ambition to embark upon a second legislative programme
comparable to the 1985 White Paper.As far as it can be judged until now, the Single Market is operating properly without
major difficulties - apart from transitional problems particularly for small and medium
sized enterprises earlier this year.
It is too early to assess the full economic impact of the Internal Market, as firms have not
yet had sufficient time to adjust to the new legislation and the process of transposition of
measures into national laws is still continuing. Even though it will be some time before
the effects of Internal Market legislation fully come on stream, it is already evident that
this legislation has been the catalyst for a thorough shake-up of key industry and services
sectors. By injecting a new dynamism into lethargic sectors, the Internal Market may
pave the way for improved competitiveness on the part of individual EC companies. It is
this qualitative shift in the degree of cross-border competition which will be the greatest
legacy of the Internal Market. In turn, this structural change in the EC economy may act
as the dynamo for further development of many EC industry and service sectors. The
Commission will launch a large-scale study in 1994 with a view to completion by 1996 to
analyse the full effect of the legislative programme.
The process of the completion of the Single Market has strengthened the mutually
profitable economic and commercial links between the member states. This has been
reflected in a steady increase in the proportion of intra EC-trade as a component of
industrial and services output, and a Europeanisation of company corporate and
investment strategies to allow firms to take advantage of newly accessible commercial
opportunities in other member states. However, the Internal Market programme is not
being constructed in an economic vacuum. The current recession, which has been
provoked by forces unrelated to the completion of the Internal Market, has
overshadowed the process of adaptation to the emerging single market framework. The
depressed state of EC markets obscures the potential market openings created by the
Internal Market. In addition, many, particularly small and medium sized, companies do
not have .the resources or are wary of positioning themselves in order to take advantage
of opportunities which lie around the comer. However
, there are strong reasons to
believe that the restructuring and investment undertaken during the late 1980s in
anticipation of the internal market have helped to mitigate some of the effects 
of the
current downturn. Looking forward, the single market will provide added impetus to the
development of individual companies once economic recovery gets underway.
The widening of the scope for exchange rate divergences has prompted concernS that
increased "exchange rate-risk" could dissuade companies from engaging in cross-border
trade and investment. While "exchange rate risk" does introduce an added degree of
uncertainty to transactions denominated in partner currencies, the impact on intra-
trade and investment may be clearly offset through the use of hedging techniques. These
however, remain expensive, mainly for SMEs. Furthermore, exhange rate stability, based
on sound economic convergence, remains an essential component of the Internal Market
and it represents a prerequisite if the progress in liberalising capital markets and financial
services is to be safeguarded. From the point of view of the Internal Market, it is to be
hoped that the macroeconomic conditions which are needed to sustain a high degree of
exchange rate stability can be restored at the earliest possible date.Against this background the further reinforcement of an already well-established Single
Market - as outlined in the strategic programme - is of major importance to counteract
any negative tendencies. Maintenance of astable and properly working Single Market
will provide the basis for the realisation of the .second step of the European Monetary
Union. The widening of exchange rate fluctuation bands has increased the risk of sudden
competitive depreciations. The introduction of a single currency would remove this risk,
as well as the nuisance and costs caused by the coexistence of several currencies in an
integrated economic zone. The objective of a single currency remains a logical
development of the largely achieved Internal Market programme.Annex to Part I
Charts by Member State
(1980 - 1993)
- Real GDP/head of population
- Unemployment rate
- Inflation
- Balance of current transactions
- Net borrowing requirement (general government)
- Long term interest rate
- Real unit labour costsBelgium
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in % 120  Index 
/ "
"~" Growth 
/ ~ ~ ,
11 0 ,
",-,_........ -,----_...._- ___ __"-_..__...._.._- /----"", ..-- " ~"-- ""-""- ~ / " ,/ 
' 0 100
-2.
Inflation
in%
- 3 worst (a)
__..n"_ _'-'-'-8elgium 
" ..,
15 ,-,-,_......,",.._",
',--"......,",.._~,..... "..,.."....,..,_..".., ::::",-,?,,~~,.__.
(al,
Net borrowing
in % of GDP: geheral government
"'----"-'-""""""""'--"----""-
6 ,-
--..-- ......-......,-,-,....."..------..'..------......""---
Real unit labour costs
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
95 
,..,-,..,..__....",..,..,.....-
Unemployment rate
in%
12 
-"....--...
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
5 '
"----"""'--"-"""'-
Long term interest rate
in%
- 3 highest (b)
,,-......
Belgium
-, 3 lowest (b)
8 '
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission services, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)
c;1Denmark
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987 = 1 00 Growth: in % 110 
---
1 00 -'-'-.""
-:'--"
.:!"'---"."'..'-""""h \
\ /' \ ~, / ' --- \ / 
90 
V' 
...... Index ._- Growth
Inflation
in%
- 3 worst (a)
20 
..h.. ",.'.'_h".,_," "h'_"_'h",."","" """"'h""" """""""""-,,'..'_"h""'h,,,"""""""h"'.
..... Denmark
15 h.
...h...h h_.... .-.a.best . (a)
...."'-.
5 ~-=='
::-'=':";:"'."':::'::'::::::-:"_
~'h'hh"'_"'- '--""'-"""".'.'h"""""
""""'.""""'" " -
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Net borrowing
in % of GDP; general government
........ 
....... .,-",."hhh.............h.h........h....'.""""""""
"'.."""""",."
,"""h....
"."
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Real unit labour costs
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
h.....................h.' ....
........
95 .
"h-_
.""-'- "-'."" . ..
.... h..
......
....h'.'h..... .h.........
Unemployment rate
in%
.....
.h..hhh.......'" ....
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
5 "."_""hh"
"""".'
5 .
..........-....-"."'"
long term interest rate
in%
16 .
."'_
h"'
f\igl1esf(bY"
'h.......p.~lJm~r~..
- -
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission seNices, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)
b 0/~ / 
1 05 ,..
:~:~:~:~:' ::':::~:~?~"""'::':~~~=~;::~~~=:::' ~:~,....::::, ::~~\ \:::~:"
:' 2.
\ 0
95 "..""""",
::::!""...."..."..,..., ,..,..,.""",.....",..""..""""""",.."""" .."",""",.......",.,...,.",. ..".. ..""..'...""-'" .'-""""-"""'-"'-""- ....""'
Inaex'."""
~-:::' :""'
Growtl;f.. -
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Germany
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in %
115
Inflation
in%
3~~W
20 ,..
",,- -'.""""".""""."."."""" """"""""""""" """"
Germany"
15 
,..,..,........,...."....,..'",..."......._..". .. """"""" ,,-"""'
bast" (a)".
10 _..""..,...".."..",..,..,..,.
""..".,......,...."....,.. """"" ...
Net borrowing
in % .of GDP;generai government
Real unit labour costs
Index: 1987=100; total economy
100 
,..,.."....
Unemployment rate
in%
...... ........",."..""""" ....."....,..,....,."."""......
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
long term interest rate
in%
20 .,,
'...""" """"'
hlghesf(b).""..
~.. 
G!i!.flI1CinY...
""-
-... 3 lowest b)
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (excl. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission services, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)
6 (Greece
Real GDPjhead of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in % 110 
..... Index --- Growth
: ' .."
r."..."""". . 2.
.-....
1........
............ \ '
, 0
\ ,  \, ..
1 00 .......
-...-.-...-.----..'/....----. \- 
1""
Inflation
in%
15 
..-..........
~JiIJ..Q..~t(!,!., 
..... ....".......... ....
Greece
1 0 '
::::::"""
besr.(a)"""""""""""'"
5 ~~.
~=:::::. ,:.:::.~=.:::.:::.~....... " -
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Net borrowing
in % of GDP; general government
""'.. " """"", """"""". "'"
16 .-...........
.......-.-........................................... ................. ..................... ..
80 82 84 86 88 
......... .........................-........................ ..........."....................................
ReaD unit labour costs
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
..............-................
Unemployment rate
in%
8 .........
...........
6 .
5 ....
....... ...
80 
................................-.......... ......-..... .......-.. ...............-.......... .............."............................. .....................-
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
5 ....
...
long term interest rate
in%
20 .
12 ..
' "..., " .
7-- highest (b)
...
8 ~""'.. Qece-
~"-":'::-==""""" /~::::::" ':::~
,,_. 3 lowest (b) --
(a) Unweighted averages ofthe 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (excl. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission services, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)
r; Spain
Real GDPjhead of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in %
Unemployment rate
in%
115 
"" ""!!,,, "
Indsx"", ""'.
""""" 
"'i;:;;""""",,-:::"""  20 -
~- Growth 
/ "
1 05 ,,
::::::::::::::::::::::::' ::::::::::::::::
~:;2-:'::::::::::::::.. .
:::::::::::::::::::::~:;;~:':::::::'
:::::::: 2.
95 
'-"""""" ,(.~"""" """""""'"  -......................-.........................\........
Inflation
ih%
~ 3 worst (a)
20 .........
.......................................................""" ;;;;;;;;"'
SpaIn-
"""""""""
15 . .............
,....,...... ........... ........................ -.....
a-.best..( a).. .
...
5 ~:..
::.:::'::. ",:::::..::::=-:::.~........,........,... " - --- ...- ......
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Net borrowing
in % of GDP;geheral government
8 .....-..................
.....-.................................................. .................................... "" "","""""""""""-"""" .. ... ......................
Real unit labour costs
Index: 1987==100; total economy
115
110 
.-.......... ........................ """""""""""""
105
....
1 00 .-.....
.................... .......... .... ..................... .......,.......... ..... .................. ... ...................... ...............................................-........._.
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
long term interest rate
in%
20 ...
.....
12 ..
.... . . ..  ...... ..
~ highest (b)
8 ~:"'. S'pafn::::-:-~"
-..::.:.:::.:::... ~;;/~--:~::::,,.-,::::::
.-. 3 lowest (b) --
-..
80 82 84 86 88 90 
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (excl. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission services, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)
G SFrance.
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in % 120 
..... Index
"-" Growth /
11 0 
'-'-'.-" ""-.'-'-.-" "'."".'."."'.""".'.'
f'-"""""'-'-
.... \
1\ ~
\ ~ \ ~ / \...  \ /\ ... \/
100
Inflation
in%
- 3 worst (a)
20 .-......
""-"-'-'.." """'.'._-'_.."'.'...""-'. ;:;;;;;-'.
Franc~"....
15 .---...
.......-...................... ....................... --...
3-best....(a).
......
5 ~::=.
::::::.::::::. ,,:;::::::::~..:~..=. """""""""".."""."",.,.,
u,u.,,',,',"
, ... , -
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Net borrowing
in % of GDP; .general ~tovernment
6 ...
-..................................................................................,... .....
4 -
Real unit labour .costs
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
100
Unemployment rate
in%
10 
..................... .. .............."."""
Balance of current transactions
In %ofGDP
5 ..
long term interest rate
in%
20 ....
....................... ............. ... ,..- ......,." ......."",.
- 3 highest (b)
16 ,/ '\. ..... France
8 ~~~~~=~~~'
:::==:::'~"'~ ":':' ::'=':==~.
~~:;7
""::'
=::C:" ,
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission services, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)
t;; 4Ireland
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in %
135 ...... Index 
/ \
125 -.
"""""""""""""""""""""""""'"'.
"""""""""""""""'"""'l""""L.. .. """""""". 7 
--- 
Growth / 
115 ..
::::=--::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::-::::::::::::::::::::::::::::'::::::::/:::::.. .::::::::::
L:::::::::::::::::::. 5
1 05 
.:.::=~:=:~..
::::=:i~:':.\~:::::::-::/:"'
--'",::,:===:=:::::::::\;/~
~~~\~~ 2.
95 
...................\;--......-/--...... """" '; -
"""""""""""'-""""""""-'-"""""""""""""" 0 85  80 82 84 86 88 90 
Inflation
in%
~ 3 worst (a)
""""""""""""""""""'-""""' ~""'
ireilina"
""'" ..
5' -:.::-..==.
=..::::. ",::-::::::::.:::-:.., - --- -- " -
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Net borrowing
in % of GOP; general government
10 ....
.....-...........-............-... ................. "" ..""-""""""""""""""
8 "
""" ."""'."""""""""""""""'-""""""""""'" """"""-"'.""""""""""."""""""""'-
6 ..............
,..................".
4 ,,-,
""""""""""""" """"""""""""""
2 ..............
...........-...............................,........
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Real unit labour costs
Index: 1987=100; total economy
115
........................."..................... ................................
100
",- """"""""""""", .
Unemployment rate
in%
19 
.............""""""""""'" ............-. .....-................. ...........-.. "..-.............
17 
"""""'" ..""""""""""-
80 82 84 86 88 90 
........... .........................-..- ..............................-......"......... """"-"""""'-"""'-"" """"""'-""""-"""""""""""-' .............................................................................. ,..........
Balance of current transactions
in % ofGDP
5 .
......
5 .
5 .
10 
................ ..................... ............"............ ............."""""""-'"
12.
......... .......
80 62 84 66 88 90 
.................................... ...-................, ............................ ..........................................."..........
long term interest rate
in%
..-- 3 highest (b)
.... ..........
Jr.e.land......
............
--- 3 lowest (b)
12-
~~' ~~-::::-.~",~."..................._............. '/-~' :::'-::":"
-X:"
......... 
84 . 86
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission services, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)Italy
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987 = 1 00 Growth: in %
.... Index -~- Growth
115 ..
""""""""""".",m"",""""""""""""""""""""""""""""".."""",..",.""""""""".., 5
Unemployment rate
in%
10 .
105
==-":::~:'::::::::::::::::~~;;;:';;:_
:::2:::::==::::-'. .
...
:~~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::" 2.
" '
95 
-.'-:"-~."" --;'
.,I............~ 
-",---"".,.",-"""-,,-"'.'.""-""""" :::"',,..... .... / 
, 0
Inflation
in%
- 3 worst (a)
"""""""""""""""""""';;;;;;;"'
itaiV""""
" .. ...
--.3 best (a)
Net borrowing
in % of GDP; general govemment
Real unR labour co~s
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
.......................-.................... .......... .... ................ ......................".. ................................
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
Long term intere~ rate
in%
-"3'highest.(b)"
-Italy
",.................................................. ....
..- 3 lowest (b
12 .
8 / " c~~...:
=~~~' ~~~,/-:-:-::::-_-":::'
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (excl. GR and P) rates
Source: Commission seNices, economic forecasts (Autumn  1993)
;; (;Luxembourg
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in %
120
/\ 
11 0  ='=='==='==='='='===f'==
~='==========='='==
f; 
. ;='============='===,.  \ / \ / ,\/ \ 
1 00. 
...:::::::.:::::::::
~~;t:::::::.:::==:~:::-~::~:-'" 
- . -==::::::::::::::,::\:"=:
=~:::::::::::::::.. 2.
90 .-..-...-
,!"-,.......... ....._-_.._..........._..__..................................._............
...... Index "-- Growth 0
Inflation
in%
-3 worst (a)
20 '
..""" -.-.........................,...................................-........................................................ ...
Luxembourg
15 """,""_"'d"""d_..".._"""""'d' "'d.._m"_d.
._...
a..best...(a)...
5 --::=~'
=~'::' ":':;:' :=':'-_
~d""""""'d"""" "d""'_ =="_d
="..
d."
" - " ~
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Net borrowing
in % of GDP; general government
..........dd.._.d"""""""""",_d................... """"""""""""""-"""",,,,'d....d.
............-.....
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Real unit labour costs
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
100 """",
"'" ..
95 ......
................-...
Unemployment rate
in%
2 ......
,...-..........
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
40 .
35 ...
.............. ....
30 ......
25 
......
long term interest rate
in%
20 .
.......... ............. .. ............
~ 3 highest (b)
. ......
. Luxembourg...
-..
- 3 lowest (b)
(a) Unweighted averages ofthe 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR and P) rates
( 1-Netherlands
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in %
115 .
-'....
Index.""""""'----""""""
"'-"'- """
l"..............-
"..,.-.........
I " ~, Growt~ 
1 05 ":==:::::==::===:::::7:=:=S:;;=;~;:::::=:=:~Z::._-
=...
:::::\~=::=:=:::::=:~ 2.
\ \
\ 0
, I
Inflation
in%
- 3 worst (a)
20 
........ " -"""""""""""" ""'-'-"""""""""""'-
Nethei1ands...
15 """""""""'-""""""""""
.""" ..........,,-... .-.....
3best.(a)... .
5 ""'
:=:=':"" "':::':::"""'-----""""'. "'-"'.'."'-"'. "".'.."-."""""""".""" ."""" ~--
Net borrowing
in % of GDP; general government
8, ..
........... """"'" .................-........ ................ .
2 .
............... ...............
Real unit labour CO~s
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
100 .
95 ---.-.......""........._u.
Unemployment rate
in%
12 
.............
..u
"'".""'.'.""."'"
Balance of current transactions
in %ofGDP
long term intere~ rate
in%
- 3 highest (b)
~. "
=~:::e
:~~:~ '-. --- ,,-,
8 .
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR and P) ratesPortugal
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in %
115  :~::::lndeX::::::::::::::::::::::;;:?;=:S;;::::::;::'.'::S"" .m_..
:::::::::::::::..  ..-.. 
Growth 
1 05 
~:~::::~::::::~:;;:~'~:~:::::::'
:::::::~r:~:::~=::~:~:
~:~:~::m.
:....
=~:~:~:::::::::~s:~~:::'
' 0
95 
,....m""""""""""
I...m...m.
................m"" 'h'" ..
"" .. . -
Inflation
ih%
20 
.....
....m................
...........~..
~C?~H~)..
.... 
Portugal
_.._.......m..""""""" ................
.................... ....................,...........................
_. 3  best (a)
10 
......m
""""""'-""""""""""""""""""""......
5 ~=:::'
:=:'::"
,,::.:.......m......
.................. ...............................,.......... ............... .... ~--~ " -
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Net  borrowing
in % of GDP; general government
12 
""","00'
,""" ,""
""""""'" ..._..m.....mm.................."'h........ h..............h"'"
10 
...00."",
"""""""
6 ..............
......m'h.........hm..hhh....."'"
4 ....
.....m..
""""""" ""'"
.....00"'0000"""00"""""""" h.
..........................
.......m...h..mhh...........
""""-""
80 82 84 86 88 90 
Real  unR labour co~s
Index: 1987=100; total economy
120
""""""""
00"""_,,,"00"""
100
95 
00"""-"_ 00"00"""_" '_00"""""""'_'_"'00"""""00'
"....
Unemployment rate
in%
Balance of current transactions
in % ofGDP
00...
-5 
..00
.........
10 
.. ...."""
12.
.......................
...........00..00.00.
h........h.hm.m.."
00.......... 00..........00""
long term interest rate
in%
;i...high~~!(~).m.
.... 
Portugal
.....................
00...."
"""" .....
- 3  lowest (b)
12 .
8 ~~'
~~~- ::: ::..:..:.::.:~:;..;..;"/::::::::::-""~-~::
(a) Uhweighted averages of the 3 best (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR and P) rates
r; United Kingdom
Real GDP/head of population
Index: 1987=100 Growth: in %
110
...............................................................................-.......... ......
,.....- 5
, /
1 00 -
'"'='='='='=,"
)I":-..;=;,=~ ,,,=;r.f,"==",===:-,,==, ~:-..,:-..===c",=,=,",==,=======:-..,=,====,. . 2 5
/ '-
I ' I '
90.. 
""-"
i"""""""""""""
""  ,....,.....,......,................. ..........,........\-.......
i""'"
\ , \ , --.....-...... """""""""""""",-"""" """ "'"""",,,, ,-,,'-.'...,-..-..,.....-.......
'c..........
.... -
Index --- Growth
Inflation
in%
~ 3 wol'$t (a)
20 
......... .............................................. ...........................-.... ........................... ...................
United Kingdom
15 "_...c..............
.............................. .......... ...........
(3-.best...(a)............. ..
---
Net borrowing
in % of GDP; general government
8 """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
""""""-".....-..............................................
6 """"""""""""
"'-"'-" '................................ ............................................................
Real unR labour Co~S
Index: 1987=100; total economy
110
100 
...........
Unemployment rate
in%
Balance of current transactions
in%ofGDP
2..
5 .
5 .
...........................
Long term intere~ rate
in%
20 
........... ..................................-..................................
~ 3 highest (b)
..... ~...
Unite.d.KingdQm
--- 3 lowest (b)
.....
12 
.............
8 ~
---- - . . "
(a) Unweighted averages of the 3 bast (worst) performing Member States
(b) Unweighted averages of the 3 highest (lowest) Member States (exel. GR andP) rates 7-t'